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Abstract
There has been a significant increase in private sector participation (PSP) in the urban water supply and
sanitation (WSS) sector in recent years.  However, even with increased PSP, public authorities will still
have to: ensure that the service providers do not use their market power to exploit customers; internalise
public health and environmental externalities; provide mechanisms whereby water consumption is
sustainable and is allocated efficiently between alternative uses; and, serve as a guarantor of a level of
service provision which is consistent with a basic standard of living. While there is considerable literature
addressing the first of these four issues, the latter three are less adequately addressed.  Through a
review of five case studies (Abidjan, Buenos Aires,  Córdoba, Mexico City, and Manila), this paper
provides an overview of the issues involved and some of the mechanisms available to the authorities
responsible for the regulation of the sector.*Corresponding author1
1. Introduction
In recent years there has been a significant increase in private sector participation (PSP) in the
delivery of urban water supply and sanitation (WSS) in developing countries.  This is largely
attributable to a perception that governments have been unable to manage the sector efficiently and do
not have the funds required to undertake much-needed investments.  However, due to the
characteristics of the sector, the regulatory authorities will have to continue to fulfil the following
functions:
•  ensure that the service providers do not use their privileged position in the market to exploit their
customers;
•  internalise the externalities associated with adverse effects on public health and the environment;
•  provide mechanisms whereby aggregate water use is sustainable and water is allocated efficiently
between alternative uses;
•  serve as a guarantor of a level of service provision, which is consistent with a basic standard of
living.
  While there is considerable literature addressing the effects of increased PSP on the first of these four
issues, the latter three are less adequately addressed. This paper is not primarily about the relative
merits of private versus public service provision in terms of the efficiency of service provision, but
rather about how best to meet environmental and social objectives given increased private sector
participation.
 Moreover, since it is the agency whose role has changed most significantly (indeed it may
have only come into existence with the onset of PSP), the paper concentrates on the role of the
sectoral “economic” regulator, rather than other public authorities that influence the sector.
 
  The study is an overview report, drawn largely from five case studies (Manila, Buenos Aires,
Córdoba, Mexico and Abidjan), prepared by researchers familiar with the sector in the respective
cities.
1  While the individual reports provide more detail on the individual cases
2, this paper attempts to
draw together the experience in the five cities in order to highlight some of the potential opportunities
and pitfalls presented by PSP in terms of the realisation of social and environmental objectives.
 
  Following this brief introduction, Section 2 reviews the role of PSP in the sector.  Section 3 provides a
discussion of the need for public intervention in the sector on the basis of the potential for market
failure with respect to social and environmental concerns and discusses the role of the economic
regulator in ensuring that these social and environmental objectives are realised.  Section 4 reviews
some of the main conclusions based on the four case studies.
 
2. Private Sector Participation in the WSS Sector
  Until very recently, the only countries with a significant degree of private participation in the WSS
sector were France, the United Kingdom and the United States. Of all public utilities, WSS was the
sector in which the formal private sector was least active and, in developing countries was almost non-
existent. However, this is changing rapidly as many developing countries involve the private sector
                                                
1 The case studies were prepared by Cristina David (Manila), Martin Rodríguez  Pardina and Sergio
Mazzucchelli (Buenos Aires and Córdoba), Lillian Saade (Mexico City) and Ake N’Gbo (Abidjan).  The project
was funded by DANIDA and the full report will be published in due course.  In the interim, mimeo copies of the
report can be obtained from the corresponding author.  Details on the publication of any of the case studies can
also be obtained from the corresponding author.
2 Details about the publication of any of the case studies can also be obtained from the corresponding
author.2
(usually European or North American firms in partnership with a local firm) in the provision of WSS in
urban areas.  Between 1990 and 1997, the cumulative new private sector capital expenditure on WSS
projects in developing countries was $25 billion, compared with $297 million in the period 1984-1990.
By 1997, a total of 97 projects had been implemented in 35 developing countries, ranging from
management contracts to leases, concessions, divestitures and build-operate-own-transfer (BOOT)
agreements (see Silva et al 1998).
 
  The increase in PSP has been driven in large part by a desperate need for increased capital investment
in WSS in many cities. In the majority of developing countries experiencing rapidly growing urban
populations and a reduction in assistance for WSS from international development agencies, public
sources of finance are no longer able to bear the costs of system rehabilitation and expansion.  In
addition, it is often considered that public authorities have been unable to manage urban WSS




•  Gamekeeper-Poacher Problems - Public water and sewage utilities will tend to be inefficiently
managed since governments have multiple objectives but limited financial resources. With the
government as both owner and provider, the utility’s management is subject to a number of conflicting
influences which it may not be able to balance if clear priorities are not established.
•  Flexibility and Autonomy - At the level of operations, public utilities are often constrained by
bureaucratic requirements which do not affect private firms.  For instance, there is often considerable
inflexibility in the management of human resources within public utilities.
•  Absence of Competitive Discipline - Since public utilities are not usually subject to the disciplines
of the market they have fewer incentives to minimise costs (and maximise tariff collection rates) and
provide services in the manner customers demand.
  However, it must be recognised that there are numerous examples of efficiently managed public water
and sanitation utilities in developing countries (see Ingram and Kessides 1994 and Nickson 1997).
There are documented cases in countries as diverse as Ecuador, Chile, Zimbabwe and Botswana. In
many cases, this has been attributable to the provision of a certain degree of autonomy to the service
provider (municipality, parastatal, etc...), as well as the introduction of effective incentives to the
provider and staff members (see Estache 1994).
 
  “Government failure” is not, in itself, sufficient to justify private sector involvement in the sector.  A
private monopolistic service provider may well exacerbate the situation, taking advantage of its
privileged position in the market at the expense of service users.  Thus, perhaps an equally important
motivation for the increase in PSP, is the fact that there is now a widespread belief that PSP need not
result in monopoly profits. On the one hand, the consensus that water and sanitation services are
natural monopolies has been called into question. While the entire chain of provision (raw water supply,
water treatment, water distribution, wastewater collection and wastewater treatment) may exhibit
economies of scale, individual aspects of the WSS system may not be characterised by decreasing
costs, thus allowing for vertical “unbundling” of the sector with multiple providers at some stages.  For
instance, metering, operations and maintenance, billing, and a number of other aspects of service
provision can be hived off from the core of the WSS sector.  Similarly, firms can be given contracts to
undertake significant investments in specific infrastructural areas such as wastewater treatment plants.
On the other hand, it has been recognised that even if technological and economic characteristics are
                                                
3 See Nickson 1997, Ingram and Kessides 1994,  Idelovitch and Ringskog 1995, and Mody 1996 for
discussions.3
such that monopoly provision is “efficient”, more comprehensive forms of PSP can still be introduced.
Drawing on the work of Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) it has been pointed out that as long as a
market is contestable (i.e. there is the potential for firm entry), a single provider will not necessarily
behave monopolistically as long as there is competition for the market, if not directly in the market.
4
Thus, firms can be granted the right to provide all WSS services within a given area over a pre-defined
period of time.
 




•  Service contracts - are the simplest form of PSP, involving short-term contracts to provide limited
services, such as reading meters, repairing leaks, and mailing statements for payment.  These
contracts entail carrying out specific duties and do not require any overall private sector responsibility
for system operation.  Small service contracts have existed in many cities for a number of years, but in
recent years there has been a shift towards more comprehensive types of service contract.
•  Management contracts - require somewhat greater private sector responsibility with the private
company assuming day-to-day responsibility for system operation and maintenance. However,
management contracts do not usually require any private investment, the private company does not
assume commercial risk, and does not have any direct legal relationship with the consumer. The
national or local government must maintain financial responsibility for the system and the capacity to
plan and finance system expansion. The contractor does not get paid unless fees are collected from
the consumers, and has an incentive to improve system management under the stipulations of the
contract.
•  Leases - allow a private operator to rent facilities from the public authority for a stipulated period of
time.  The public authority retains ownership and responsibility for system finance and expansion, but
the private contractor is responsible for financing working capital and accepts some commercial risk in
the day-to-day operation of the system. The private contractor is not responsible for any capital costs,
and rental fees are often based upon the costs of debt service for capital costs.  The contractor has a
direct incentive to maximise fee collection since its returns equal revenue generated less operating
costs and rental fees.  Occasionally the relationship is reversed, with the private firm building a facility
and leasing it back to a public provider.
•  BOOT contracts - are mechanisms that allow a private contractor to Build,  Own, Operate, and
Transfer a specific capital investment such as a wastewater or potable water treatment plant. Usually,
the investment is quite substantial and the contract period is long enough to allow for the recuperation
of capital expenditure.  Generally the public authority must guarantee a certain demand, such as a
volume to be treated.  The contractor accepts a risk if this demand is not met.  There are numerous
variants on this option, such as BOTs, “reverse BOOTs” and others.
•  Concessions - are long-term contracts which require the private company to invest in the system.
The concessionaire has overall responsibility for the system, including operations, maintenance,
investment and expansion.  The concessionaire receives payment directly from the consumer and
accepts the risk that costs do not exceed revenues.  The contract period is usually long enough to
                                                
4 Bidding procedures and contract design are very important in this respect. See full report for a
discussion of these issues.
5 For different taxonomies of PSP and private-public partnerships see Idelovitch and Ringskog 1995,
Gentry and Fernandez 1997, and Brook-Cowen 1997.4
allow the contractor to recover investment costs.  Penalties may be imposed upon the contractor if
specific targets or standards are not met.
•  Divestiture - may be partial, allowing for shared government and private responsibility for service
provision, through a separate corporate entity.  Generally, a corporate agreement will stipulate private
and public responsibilities, including representation on the board of directors and division of profits.
Private finance may be facilitated by the establishment of a separate credit rating with support from
the public authority.  Less frequently, the provider may be fully private, with the government only
serving a regulatory role.
In general, concessions are the most popular form of PSP in terms of both number and size of
investment.  BOTs (and variants thereof) are also common (see Table 1). Regionally, investment has
been concentrated in Latin America and East Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, accounts
for less than 1% of total investment.
TABLE 1: Private WSS Projects in Developing Countries, 1990-97
Type Projects Total investment in projects
with PSP (1997 US$ millions)
Concession 48 19,909
BOT/BOOT 30 4,037
Operations and management 13 n.a.
Divestiture 6 997
Total 97 24,950
Source: World Bank 1998
The case studies analysed cover a number of these options. While Mexico has been one of the
pioneers of the use of BOOT contracts (and variants thereof), Mexico City is an example of a service
contract, albeit an exceptionally large one.  Under a phased contract, the four international consortia
which were awarded the contracts are to install meters, bill households and rehabilitate the distribution
infrastructure within the Federal District.  The last phase has been described as a  Rehabilitate-
Operate-and-Transfer contract.  Given the scarcity of water resources in Mexico’s Central Valley and
the lack of information regarding the customer base, water consumption levels and network conditions,
the primary objective of the contracts is to allow for better management of water resources, and
perhaps more comprehensive forms of PSP.
Buenos Aires and Córdoba are concessions for the operation and management of the entire network.
While part of a larger national strategy to privatise public utilities, the specific motivation for the
involvement of PSP in the WSS sector was a recognition that the public service provider Obras
Sanitarias de la Nación (OSN) had been under-investing in the service for many years and was not
in a position to reverse this trend.  The concessions, which are to last for 30 years, were awarded in
1993 on the basis of international bidding procedures.  The main difference between the two
concessions relates to coverage.  In Buenos Aires, both water and sanitation are included, while in
Córdoba the municipality has retained responsibility for the sanitation system.
Manila is also a concession, covering both water and sanitation.  However, unlike in the cases of
Buenos Aires and Córdoba, the concession has been split in two. The contracts were awarded in 1997
on the basis of an international bidding procedure, and are to cover a period of 25 years.  It is hoped
that the division of the contract will facilitate the task of the regulator, which may be important since
far fewer resources were devoted to preparing the regulatory framework than in the Argentinian
cases.  Unlike many other arrangements, the contract makes explicit allowance for alternative service
providers within the concession areas, but it is assumed that the two concessionaires will eventually
monopolise service provision.5
Finally, in the case of Abidjan, where experience with PSP is much greater than elsewhere, private
sector participation has evolved from a lease arrangement, to joint ownership with the state, and
eventually to a concession.  The concession was awarded in 1987 for 20 years.  At present, the
private service provider has full responsibility for the provision of water services, and a separate
service contract to maintain sanitation facilities. However, a concession contract is being prepared for
the provision of sanitation services. Unlike in the other concessions, the regulatory regime guarantees a
return of 5% on investment undertaken, significantly reducing risks (and incentives).
Firm empirical evidence of the relative merits of private and public management of the sector in the
four case studies in terms of economic efficiency is limited.
6  Indirect evidence can be obtained
through comparison of tariff rates before and after PSP.  For instance, in the case of Buenos Aires,
tariffs charged by the private consortium were 73% of those previously charged by the state utility,
although they have since risen.
7  In Manila tariffs in the east and west of the city also fell, 25% and
57% respectively, relative to pre-concession rates. However, to the extent that these figures do not
reflect the effects of accompanying reforms in the sector as well as changes in service quality, such
evidence is not conclusive.  Only in the case of Buenos Aires has there been a systematic study of the
“efficiency” effects of private sector participation, and it is revealing that according to most criteria the
sector appears to have performed relatively worse than other privatised utilities (see Crampes and
Estache 1997).
3. The Potential for Environmental and Social Market Failures in
Water Supply and Sanitation and the Role of the “Economic”
Regulator
In addition to the potential for market failure through monopolistic service provision, there are three
other types of market failure in the sector which relate directly to environmental and social concerns:
over-exploitation and misallocation of raw water supply; health and environmental externalities from
wastewater; and the under-provision of basic needs for poorer households. This means that a
significant degree of public intervention will always be necessary to ensure that provision is not only
economically efficient, but also socially equitable and environmentally sustainable. However, in many
senses public authorities’ regulatory functions will not have changed appreciably with PSP.
Implementing agencies with direct responsibility for the realisation of social and environmental
objectives may well have roles which are indistinguishable from those they fulfilled previously when
public authorities had direct responsibility for service provision.
                                                
6 The role of ownership (rather than management per se) is better documented, but most of the evidence
relates to the United States since it is one of the few countries with a mixed private-public sector. Crain and
Zardkoohi (1978) found that the behaviour of public water utilities was much further from cost-minimisation than
those owned privately, and concluded that most of the observed difference in efficiency was due to differences
in labour productivity.  Conversely, Feigenbaum and Teeples (1983) did not find that ownership played as
significant a role in determining the relative efficiency of water and sanitation utilities as had been thought
previously.  This result may be explained by the fact that unlike previous studies, they included a number of
supply-side variables which tend to vary systematically with ownership (i.e. source of raw water supply,
population density of area served, etc...).  They also distinguish between the characteristics of the service
provided (i.e. treatment levels, reliability of service, etc…).  Teeples and Glyer (1987) refined this analysis, using
more general econometric specifications.  They found that for the least restricted regression, ownership was
statistically insignificant.  Two other studies (Lambert and Dichev 1993 and Bhattacharyya et al 1994) have even
found that public utilities are on average more efficient, albeit with much greater variability in performance.
7 They remain 17% below the pre-concession rate, although the tariff structure has just been reformed
once again. (See Jaspersen 1997 and de Yeregui 1997.)6
As such, the discussion in this section concentrates on the “economic” or “sectoral” regulator since it
is its role which changes with increased PSP.  Indeed, in most cases the “economic” regulator will
only come into existence because of PSP, mainly through concern about the potential of private sector
providers to exercise market power.  Through a variety of mechanisms (price regulation
8, service
quality standards, coverage targets, etc...), the regulator seeks to ensure that the service provider does
not over-price or under-provide services. However, although often indirectly and unintentionally, the
behaviour of the economic regulator may have very significant environmental and social
consequences.  Indeed, in some cases the role it plays may be even more important than that of the
agencies with direct responsibility for environmental and social matters. These issues are explored in
this section, with a focus on how conditions and incentives are likely to change with PSP.
3.1 Conservation and Allocation of Water Resources
In general where water is scarce and valuable, access to water is characterised by high excludability
(e.g. access to the resource can be restricted) and high subtractability (e.g. consumption by one agent
reduces availability for others), and thus has many private good characteristics which allow it to be
rationed efficiently through prices.  However, despite these characteristics, water is rarely treated as a
private good, and as a consequence it is often used excessively and allocated inefficiently (Dellapenna
1994).
From the perspective of urban service provision, two issues are of particular importance: the allocation
of water between urban and other users in the river basin, and the allocation of water amongst users
within the urban area.  The allocation of water between urban and other users is especially important
in situations where water is scarce and urban areas are growing in both income and population.  In
these cases a reallocation of water between different sectors can be expected, often leading to conflict
(Hearne and Trava, 1997). Excessive consumption by urban users (residential, commercial and
industrial) will impact adversely upon competing uses, such as water used for irrigation of agricultural
land (the converse is, of course, also true).  For instance, in the cases of Córdoba (Lago San Roque),
Mexico (Cutzamala) and Manila (Angat Dam) urban households using water compete directly with
users outside the city.  This is not as true in the case of Buenos Aires which draws most of its water
from the Rio de la Plata, for which there are no directly competing uses due to the river’s massive
flow. Water scarcity is also less of a concern in Abidjan.  In cases where raw water supply is scarce,
the over-use of water will not only impact upon other water users, including industry and agriculture,
but it  will also reduce the water available for ecological services such as the maintenance of wetlands
and fish populations.
Effective conservation and allocation of the use of groundwater is particularly problematic since it is
very difficult to ensure excludability of users. Moreover, the volume of groundwater resources is often
not known with any degree of certainty.  The exact volume of aquifers is difficult to determine, and
monitoring of withdrawals is often costly.  For this reason, groundwater is often allocated
indiscriminately on the basis of firms’ and households’ willingness and ability to invest in wells.  Since
aquifers span large areas, one withdrawal will have a negative external effect on others.  Where
groundwater extraction exceeds recharge, the negative external effects of pumping include the
following:
                                                
8 This can either take the form of cost-plus regulation (which guarantees a level of profits for the
provider) or price caps (which guarantees a price for users).  While, the latter is usually advocated since it
provides more incentives for efficiency improvements, cost-plus price regulation is more common.  However, in
practice the two systems of price regulation are quite similar7
1)  the scarcity value of the groundwater stocks is not taken into account, and withdrawn water is not
available for other users in the urban area.  With aquifers which span large areas or whose resources
are transported great distances (e.g. Mexico City) this may affect users outside of the urban area;
2)  the increased cost of pumping from an increased depth is imposed upon others.  In Buenos Aires,
groundwater from the upper strata is no longer potable, and households and firms are having to drill
deeper wells (or put their own health at risk);
3)  excessive groundwater depletion can even lead to land subsidence (Mexico City) and saltwater
intrusion (Manila).
Given the externalities associated with unsustainable water consumption, it is important that the
scarcity value of water be reflected in costs faced by service providers and service users.  With
private sector participation in the sector, the service provider’s access to raw water supply is the first
issue to be addressed since the incentive to ration and allocate water use within the urban area is
dependent upon the scarcity of water being reflected in the provider’s decision-making.  In cases
where water is allocated freely to an urban service provider (so that it does not have to account for the
needs of other users), water will not be treated as a scarce resource by the provider. However, if the
urban service provider’s access to raw surface water supply is limited in quantitative or financial
terms, then it will have an incentive to treat water as a scarce good and to ensure that its customers do
so as well.
The introduction of PSP is potentially significant since it may change the incentives of the public
authorities with responsibility for water resource management. Public authorities with responsibility for
water resources may be more likely to charge for raw water supply when it is a private sector service
provider which is the buyer than when it is another public authority.  However, despite the opportunity
presented by the introduction of PSP, this route is rarely taken.  For instance, in Mexico City urban
water service providers have not been required to pay the full scarcity value of water provided to the
City from the Cutzamala system.  The case of Manila, which draws much of its water from the Angat
Dam, is particularly interesting.  The service providers pay nothing for raw water supply and are given
priority access to the dam’s water.  While the regulator rejected efforts by the concessionaire to allow
for tariff increases due to water shortages during the drought which followed el Niño
9 - claiming that it
was a recurrent phenomenon and thus should have been foreseen by the concessionaires - other users
have fared even worse.  For instance, no water at all was provided for irrigation.  The treatment of
such phenomena in the regulatory structure is important.
In general, there has been greater attention paid to introducing incentives for the users of services
within the urban area.  Despite the cost involved, a large number of contracts have included targets to
increase metering of household connections.  Along with the introduction of use-based tariffs (usually
covering both water and sanitation), these measures provide incentives to conserve scarce water
resources.  Indeed, in the case of Mexico City, where water shortages are particularly acute, the first
two phases of the contract were largely designed to help achieve this objective. Water consumption
has subsequently fallen by as much as 10-20%.  However, it must be emphasised that the nature of
service contracts are such that incentives are weaker than in more comprehensive forms of PSP.
Thus, perhaps more significantly, the phased nature of the contract may allow for the collection of
information which will make future efforts to manage resources more effective.  Understandably, in
relatively “water-rich” cities, such as Abidjan and Buenos Aires, fewer incentives are included in the
contracts to increase metering and use-based pricing.  In the latter case, monthly water charges are
                                                
9 Water availability fell by 25%-30%.8
adjusted by a variety of criteria which are supposed to reflect levels of household water use (e.g.
dwelling surface area), but these do not provide marginal incentives to the individual household.
Many of the contracts have more direct provisions which impact upon water conservation.  For
example, many concession agreements have targets for reducing “unaccounted-for water” (UFW)
through, for example, service rehabilitation.  In Buenos Aires, UFW is targeted to drop from 45% to
25% by the end of the 30-year concession.  In Manila, a reduction of UFW from 60% to 30% is
required over a 25-year period.  Other contracts include targets for the rehabilitation of the distribution
system in order to reduce water leakage rates.  This is one of the primary objectives of the third phase
of the contract in Mexico City. While such targets are valuable, in many cases it may be more
effective and less burdensome on the regulator to charge the service provider for the scarcity value of
the raw water supply and let them determine what level of “leakage” is economically efficient.
Imposing leakage reduction targets - while simultaneously providing free raw water to the
concessionaire - is likely to be an economically inefficient and administratively costly means of
conserving scarce water resources.
10
3.2 Health and Environmental Externalities
Inadequate WSS provision may result in negative environmental and public health externalities due to
unsanitary potable water supplies and inadequate wastewater collection and treatment.  Waterborne
diseases include diarrhoea, cholera, and typhoid. Diarrhoeal diseases alone can affect 700 million
people annually and result in over 5 million deaths per year.  Bilharzia can affect 200 million people
annually (see Hardoy et al 1992 for a review).  Significant reductions in morbidity and mortality,
especially among children, can be achieved through:
•  adequate access to safe, potable water;
•  adequate access to water for washing and cleaning; and
•  proper removal, treatment, and disposal of wastewater and effluent.
 
  Households recognise the adverse health effects of these diseases and (if they can afford to do so)
adjust the nature of their WSS provision accordingly.  However, even if households recognise the
health benefits of improved water and sanitation provision, they may not consider the external benefits
of their own improved WSS facility on the health of the wider community.  For instance, a household
might choose to use a simple pit latrine which is perfectly sanitary in terms of immediate environmental
consequences, but, depending upon soil conditions and housing density, it may result in externalities by
contaminating the groundwater supply of the community.  Even if the household itself draws water
from this supply, there will still tend to be excess contamination since the household’s cost of avoiding
it is likely to be greater than the household’s expected benefit from better quality groundwater arising
from their own efforts.  Thus, if on aggregate individuals only account for their personal preferences
this service will be under-provided in qualitative terms. Groundwater pollution from inadequate
sanitation facilities is a significant problem in Buenos Aires and Manila.
 
  In many cases, dealing effectively with externalities from sanitation requires the provision of collective
infrastructure to treat the wastewater that is collected.  For instance, in the case of Córdoba,
residential sewage discharges have contributed to the eutrophication of the Lago San Roque, from
which the city also draws its drinking water.  To a certain extent, pollution of surface waters due to
inadequate treatment is of significant concern in all of the case study cities. However, the adverse
effects of inadequate treatment will depend upon the characteristics of the receiving waters and their
                                                
10 However, in the case of Manila it may reflect a concern that increased water tariffs arising from pricing
raw water supply may increase the tendency for households and firms to “informally” draw down scarce
groundwater even further.9
alternative uses.  For instance, until the new Sudoeste treatment plant is completed only 5% of the
wastewater collected in Buenos Aires will be treated prior to discharge.  However, the city benefits
from the huge assimilative capacity of the Rio de la Plata. In contrast, its two primary tributaries (the
Matanza-Riachuelo and Reconquista)  into which many industries and residential neighbourhoods
discharge, are heavily polluted.
 
  As with the treatment of the scarcity value of water, the urban water and sanitation service provider is
affected by the regulation of environmental and health externalities, both as a user of raw water and as
a provider of water and sanitation services. On the one hand, the service provider’s costs of
production and its ability to meet the public authority’s objectives will be affected by the quality of raw
water supply. On the other hand, the service provider will be affected by regulations on the quality of
potable water and wastewater discharges. However, as with measures to efficiently allocate and
conserve water resources, there is no a priori need for changes to these regulations with increased
PSP. Nonetheless, PSP may necessitate the formalisation of regulations to mitigate environmental and
health externalities, since private firms may have greater incentive to reduce treatment costs than
public sector providers had.  This can be one of the great benefits of PSP, making trade-offs between
different objectives more explicit.  If environmental standards increase service costs, then this will be
more readily apparent.
 
  With PSP, it is vital that there is co-ordination between the different authorities. For example, in the
case of Buenos Aires, the concessionaire (Aguas Argentinas) argued that changes in regulations
which prevented the dumping of sludge from wastewater treatment plants at sea were not foreseen
when the tariffs were agreed upon. It has also been argued that the public authorities have not
adequately regulated the quality of discharges into the sewerage system, also affecting the viability of
the concession.  Thus, the means by which environmental standards are treated in the regulatory
regime is crucially important, particularly when prices are regulated through “price caps” rather than
“rate-of-return” formulae. In the case of Abidjan, where “rate-of-return” regulations are used, the
firm will always be able to pass on the cost of changes in standards.
 
  Efforts to mitigate environmental and health externalities are often included directly in the contracts
through which PSP is established. Most directly, this arises when specific quality objectives are
incorporated into the contracts. For instance, concession agreements often include schedules for
upgrading from direct discharge to primary treatment and eventually from primary treatment to
secondary treatment (this is the case in Buenos Aires). Similarly, drinking water quality standards are
also often incorporated directly into the contract.  To some extent, these obligations may appear to be
redundant in the presence of equivalent environmental regulations, enforced by environmental
agencies. However, by attaching such obligations directly to commercial incentives, there may be an
increased likelihood of targets being met.  Moreover, as with water conservation objectives, the
incentives of public authorities to enforce the regulations (or introduce stricter standards) may increase
with PSP. Relative to standards prevailing under OSN, water quality variables such as turbidity,
bacteriology, and free chlorine have improved markedly in Buenos Aires since the granting of the
concession. WHO standards were achieved in 1996, and principal parameters conform to the
standards required by the Argentine Ministry of Health.
 
  In most contracts, failure to meet environment-related service quality standards can result in penalty
payments, usually paid for out of a performance bond deposited with the regulator. However, it is
important that the penalties provide appropriate incentives (i.e. be sufficiently high to affect firm
behaviour) but also be credible (i.e. not be so high as to discourage their application). For instance,
some contracts only allow for the “dissolution” of the contract, which is hardly likely to be appropriate
or credible for minor infractions.  Other contracts only allow for penalties which are of a lesser value
than that of the infraction to the firm.  Thus, the determination of penalties appears to be a delicate10
balancing act.  The use of performance bonds (as in Manila, Mexico City and Buenos Aires) helps to
ensure that enforcement of penalties is credible, thus providing better incentives.
 
  Perhaps the most significant effect of PSP on the realisation of environmental and health benefits
arises from contractual targets for expansion of the wastewater collection system (or regulated on-site
facilities). Since many on-site sanitation facilities have adverse effects for groundwater pollution and
neighbourhood environmental conditions, expansion of the system will have important effects on the
reduction of local externalities. In most cases the necessary financing requirements are agreed upon
with the firm when such targets are established, with households usually paying for expansion costs
through connection charges.  However, in many cases this has been unrealistic.  The inability of many
households in Buenos Aires to pay the proposed $US1,000 sewer connection charges resulted in
delays in network expansion, and eventually re-negotiation of the contract with a revised tariff
structure, whereby the costs of expansion were borne by all service users.
 
  In cases where the capacity of public authorities to regulate externalities is inadequate, it may be
possible to design PSP in such a way as to overcome this problem, perhaps even expanding the scope
of the contract in order to internalise incentives within the firm.  For instance, by keeping sanitation in
public hands in Córdoba it can be argued that an opportunity to internalise externalities directly through
the contract itself was lost.   With the sanitation service provider discharging wastewater into the
water supply service provider’s raw water supply (Lago San Roque), a contract which covered both
services might have been easier to manage since the firm would have appropriate internal incentives.
Paradoxically, in the case of Buenos Aires where water and sanitation is not a “closed” system, the
concession included both services.
3.3 Basic Needs and Merit Goods
Access to adequate water supply and sanitation facilities are usually described as basic needs. This
implies, amongst other things, that lower-income households will tend to spend a large proportion of
their disposable income on water and sanitation.  Moreover, their expenditure on water and sanitation
will be proportionately much greater than that of richer households.
11 For instance, in Mexico, the
lowest decile spend just over 5% of their total expenditure on water services, relative to just over 1.5%
for the highest decile. In Manila, the lowest income bracket spends 8.2% of income on water services,
while the highest spends just 0.6%.
12 These differences between rich and poor in the proportion of
total expenditure allocated to water are not primarily a consequence of decreasing proportional
consumption levels, but rather, are mainly due to the inequality in access to public facilities.  In Buenos
Aires, only 19% of households in the lowest socio-economic classification have household water
                                                
11  Bahl and Linn (1992) review a number of country-level studies of water demand in developing
countries and find estimated income elasticities ranging from 0.0 to 0.4.  This is confirmed by cross-sectional
evidence, indicating that the income-elasticity of water consumption is in the region of 0.3 (Anderson and
Cavendish 1993).  However, it should be emphasised that if the nature of the service provided by the good
changes with income then the demand function may exhibit changing elasticities.  For instance, higher-income
households in which a significant proportion of water is used for recreation and aesthetic purposes ( ie,
swimming pools, gardening and car washing) may have highly price-responsive demand.  Thus, not surprisingly
it has been found that the price elasticity of demand for water differs with income levels, with elasticities being
much lower for poorer households (see Anderson and Cavendish 1993, Bahl and Linn 1992 and Idelovitch and
Ringskog 1997).  For related reasons income elasticities may also differ by income level.
12 Relative costs and expenditure on sanitation facilities are more difficult to compare since the variation
in service quality is so wide.  A number of alternative low-cost on-site facilities provide relatively inexpensive
and adequate alternatives to off-site collection systems. For instance, in many cases on-site sanitation facilities
will be preferable (in environmental, health and even convenience terms) than some types of off-site sanitation
facilities, even though they may be technologically less sophisticated and considerably less costly (see Mara
1996 and Cairncross and Feachem 1993).  However, as population density increases the number of feasible on-
site options becomes more constrained.11
connections, while 86% of the richest households do.  The comparable figures for sanitation are 13%
and 79%.  Only 20-25% of “low-income” households in Manila have household water connections.
Since the cost of vended water can far exceed network water, non-connection itself can be one of the
most important determinants of disposable income for poorer households (see Table 2 for a
comparison of the cost of vended water relative to “network” water in Abidjan and Manila).
  Table 2: Price of Water by Source in Abidjan and Manila





3  in 1995)
  Vended   1,000 - 2,000   21.80 - 71.93
  Network Water   324   5.53
13
  Water and sanitation facilities have been characterised not only as basic needs, but also as “merit” or
“beneficial” goods (Mody 1996, Roth 1987 and Franceys 1997).  This implies that society as a whole
values private consumption by individuals above and beyond those benefits reflected by personal
preferences and external health and environmental benefits. Merit goods have two characteristics.
First, they are fundamental to a person’s capacity to function in society (see Sen 1983).  Access to
affordable water and sanitation facilities are thought to constitute one such case since they are
unarguably fundamental to the realisation of a basic standard of living (see Franceys 1997 and Fass
1993).  Second, there are significant information failures in the provision of water and sanitation
facilities.  Households do not have access to (or are not able to use) all of the information necessary to
make informed choices regarding consumption. Such preference failures are particularly important in
demand for WSS, given the complexity of health effects from the consumption of too little water or
water of inadequate quality, and from the use of inadequate sanitation facilities.
14
 
  Thus, even without the existence of health and environmental externalities of the sort described above,
in the presence of  “preference” failures, households may consume too little water or water of
inadequate quality. The combined effect of these two characteristics of WSS imply that there is a
significant demand-side potential for under-provision (in both quantity and quality) even in the absence
of supply-side market failures and health and environmental externalities.  However, as with the other
market “failures” cited above, state provision is not necessary to ensure that the basic needs of poorer
households are met. Rather, the state must serve as a guarantor of a certain level of affordable
provision.  It can do so by direct means, such as providing public subsidies for water and sanitation
services to poorer households and neighbourhoods. “Free” water points would be one such example.
 
  In most cases these programmes do not materially affect the service provider, whether public or
private. However, there are a variety of ways that social objectives can be realised through the
contract itself.  One of the most common ways of attempting to realise social objectives in WSS is
through a price regulation regime which mandates a tariff schedule with positive distributional
consequences.  Thus, rising block tariffs are applied in Abidjan and Manila. In other cases (e.g.
metered households in Buenos Aires and Córdoba), a lifeline tariff is used, with a certain level of
consumption being free.
 
  However, with private service providers, there is a danger that cross-subsidisation of this form will
provide disincentives for service providers to expand into poorer neighbourhoods.  Since consumption
is (moderately) income-elastic, private firms may find that their profit rates are higher if they serve
higher-income areas first, where consumption per connection (and thus average tariff rate) is likely to
be higher. Thus, the dynamic distributional consequences in terms of service expansion rates may be
                                                
13 Households with sewer connections paid 8.52 P/m
3.
14 Roth (1987) cites an example from Thailand.12
negative since unserved areas are disproportionately poor. Conversely, the success of cross-
subsidisation in static terms may be undermined where there are multiple-household dwellings, shared
water points or public water taps.  In such cases, rising block tariffs may have perverse distributional
consequences since poorer households are more likely to rely upon sources with multiple users.  This
appears to be the case in Manila. To some extent, in the case of Buenos Aires this problem has been
addressed by adjusting the lifeline tariff for multiple household dwellings.
 
  Even in cases where consumption is not metered, other means are often used to cross-subsidise
consumption for poorer households.  For instance, Córdoba applies “zone” coefficients, in which
households in poorer neighbourhoods pay slightly more than 50% of the monthly charge of wealthier
neighbourhoods.  In Buenos Aires, a variety of proxies which are thought to be related to household
wealth (construction date and “type” of dwelling) are also applied at the level of the household for the
determination of monthly charges. However, there is likely to be a trade-off between the
administrative costs and the effectiveness of progressive pricing in reducing inequities.  Zone
coefficients and other dwelling-related proxies are unlikely to be very good guides to relative wealth,
while “means-tested” measures are likely to be costly unless they can be “piggybacked” onto other
social programmes with wide coverage.
 
  The spatial definition of the concession area can also be socially significant since it will determine the
potential scope for cross-subsidisation.  In most cities (e.g. Buenos Aires and Abidjan) single tariff
schedules are applied across the entire city, resulting in cross-subsidies from low-cost areas to high
cost-areas.
15  Depending upon the relationship between the costs of service provision and the
distribution of poorer households this can have significant social implications.  However, if concession
areas do not cover a reasonable proportion of wealthier neighbourhoods it will be difficult to cross-
subsidise poorer households. As noted, in Manila, the concession has been split in two, with tariff rates
in the East Zone less than 50% of those in the West Zone. Although such a split eases the regulatory
burden through enabling ‘yardstick’ comparisons to be made, it may limit the potential for cross-
subsidisation if one of the zones contains an insufficient proportion of wealthy households.
 
  The means by which expansion costs are financed is also important.  As noted above, the terms of
many contracts have required private sector service providers to finance network expansion out of
connection fees.  This has often resulted in unaffordable connection fees for many poorer households
with little or no access to savings or credit.  Indeed, in many cases the costs will be even greater in
poorer neighbourhoods since they may have been developed in an unplanned manner, located far from
the existing network, or be situated in areas with difficult topographical conditions. One possible
solution is to provide finance for credit schemes which effectively convert connection fees into
monthly payments. In Buenos Aires, the concessionaire has to provide two-year financing for
connection charges.
 
  Alternatively, it may be preferable to finance expansion costs from charges imposed on all users and
not just new users.  This is likely to be more equitable since in many cases users of the existing
network did not pay for access when they were connected.  The Buenos Aires case, where a
surcharge on all users has been applied, is illustrative in this regard.  In Abidjan, an investment fund is
financed out of a special water tax, effectively reducing connection charges for new users. In addition,
a number of free “social” connections are provided for poorer households. Since these are financed
through the water tax, this means that the “social” connections are cross-subsidised by all connected
users. Finally, another alternative which avoids this problem is the use of in-kind labour inputs as a
                                                
15 Indeed, the same rate applies to all of Côte d’Ivoire, with low-cost Abidjan cross-subsidising other
areas.13
substitute for financial payments in exchange for connection.  Such a strategy has proven to be
successful in Buenos Aires, actually accelerating service expansion rates.
 
  However, it is important to remember that even if the terms of the contracts are met, full water and
sewerage coverage will not be attained in some neighbourhoods for up to thirty years. Since the costs
of provision are often higher and demand lower in poorer neighbourhoods, it is likely to be the most
disadvantaged that find themselves in such a position if the firm is allowed to determine the spatial
pattern of expansion.  This raises the question as to whether or not the obligations of the agreement
should be prioritised by area, since poorer households may not have the financial resources required to
adopt alternative measures which do not generate externalities. Unlike many other contracts, the
Manila concession provides targets at a relatively decentralised level, although it is not clear that socio-
economic criteria were used for prioritisation.  In other cases it may be preferable to differentiate
services by neighbourhood, reflecting differences in the ability and willingness to pay for WSS
services.  In the case of Buenos Aires the concessionaire has worked with NGOs and local
communities to try to devise alternative sanitation systems which are more consistent with households’
ability and willingness to pay.  However, in such cases it is important that the services provided
actually reflect demand and that tariffs reflect the lower level of service provision.
 
  In a related vein, it may be necessary to mandate “interim” measures in the terms of the
concessionaire’s contract.  For instance, the concession could include obligations for latrine and septic
tank maintenance, as well as the provision of public water points or trucked water.  The Manila
concession includes obligations of this kind, requiring the concessionaires to provide and manage public
standpipes and septic tanks in areas where household water connections and sewerage are not
scheduled to be introduced in the near future.  Analogously, in peri-urban areas of Abidjan, SODECI,
the concessionaire, works with licensed retailers to supply water to low-income households who have
not yet been connected to the system.  However, this licensed resale has resulted in higher unit costs
than for direct network customers.  More controversially, since many poorer households are dependent
upon “illegal” sources of water (directly and indirectly), it will not be equitable to close all illegal
connections immediately upon granting monopoly rights of provision to a private firm (Manila
introduced an “amnesty” on illegal connections when PSP was introduced). The same holds true for
unregulated and unlicensed groundwater abstraction, which is a persistent problem in many of the case
studies.
3.4 Conclusions
  Although the primary responsibility of economic regulators is to ensure that private sector service
providers do not over-price and/or under-provide services, the means by which they regulate the sector
can also have significant environmental and social implications.   Indeed, in some cases their role may
be even more significant than those public authorities that have direct responsibility for environmental
and social concerns.  Table 3 reviews some of the measures, described above, which have been
important in the five case studies examined.
  Table 3: Social and Environmental Market Failures and PSP-Related Measures
  Source of Market Failure   Measures   Examples
  Merit goods
  and preference failures
•  Lifeline tariffs
•  Rising block tariffs
•  Credit/financing schemes
•  Social connections and
preferential tariffs
•  Service Differentiation
￿ Buenos Aires, Córdoba
￿ Abidjan, Mexico
￿ Buenos Aires
￿ Abidjan and Córdoba
 
￿ Manila and Buenos Aires
  Raw water conservation
  and allocation
•  Use-based water pricing
•  Metering targets
￿ Manila, Córdoba, Abidjan
￿ Mexico14
•  Leakage targets
 
•  Rehabilitation contracts
•  Withdrawal fees/permits





  and health externalities
•  Quality targets
•  Treatment upgrading targets
•  Coverage/expansion targets
•  “Interim” Measures
16
￿ Buenos Aires, Abidjan
￿ Buenos Aires, Manila
￿ Buenos Aires, Manila
￿ Manila, Abidjan
 
  However, as with ensuring that efficiency objectives are realised, in order to ensure that social and
environmental objectives are realised, the economic regulator must be effective. This means
overcoming three potential barriers to the regulator’s effectiveness:
 
•  Insufficient technical expertise.  Regulatory offices are often staffed by employees of the
previous public provider. Since the skills required are very different, this can prove to be a significant
constraint on effective regulation.
•  Rent-seeking.  While this problem exists in all countries (see Helm 1994 for a discussion of the UK
case), regulators may be more susceptible to rent-seeking in countries where the gap in pay between
the regulatory office and the service provider is great.
•  Regulatory capture. The potential for regulatory capture increases in conditions where information
is scarce.  Since the introduction of PSP has often been undertaken very quickly and with limited
preparatory work, regulatory capture is quite likely.
  As has been discussed elsewhere, overcoming these barriers can be exceedingly difficult, particularly
in poorer countries with limited financial resources and which have only recently reformed their
sectors (see Mody 1996 and Kerf and Smith 1997).  Perhaps more importantly, the service provider
will be subject to different forms of regulation from the environment ministry, the health ministry, the
rivers and/or coastal waters authority, municipal housing agencies, and land use and planning agencies.
This raises the potential for “common agency” problems, whereby a number of regulatory agencies or
ministries are involved in the operating conditions of the utility and there is insufficient co-ordination
between them (see Sappington 1996).  Resolving these two sets of problems is key to the realisation of




  PSP in urban WSS is likely to continue to increase in importance in developing countries in the coming
years.  For this reason it is vital that PSP is consistent not only with efficiency objectives, but also with
the realisation of social and environmental objectives.  On the basis of the case studies examined, it
would seem that the experience thus far has been mixed.  In many cases, there have been clear and
important benefits, with positive environmental and social consequences: service networks have
expanded into poorer neighbourhoods, users often have more appropriate incentives for more prudent
water use, wastewater treatment levels are improving; and, in some cases measures are being adopted
to make services more affordable.  However, there is still a great deal to be done.  The following are
particularly pertinent:
 
                                                
16 In the case of Buenos Aires a number of interim measures have been introduced but these were not
explicitly included in the contract.15
•  The technical specifications of the contract must be consistent with household preferences and
their ability to pay for services.  Expansion targets cannot be met if services are unaffordable and/or
inappropriate.  In some cases it may be preferable to differentiate services by neighbourhood.   This
will usually require considerably more preparatory work - including household surveys, and not just
technical feasibility studies - prior to initiating the bidding process.
•  Even in cases where the ultimate objective is universal coverage of a standardised level of service
provision, the sheer level of under-investment in the past means that this may take many years.  Thus,
it is important to introduce measures which help poorer households realise some of the benefits of PSP
in the short- and medium-term.  In some cases this may involve explicit prioritisation by neighbourhood,
or the inclusion of interim forms of service provision explicitly in the contracts.  Measures that increase
access to credit and the provision of alternative payment schemes (including in-kind inputs) may also
be used.
•  While it is important that lower-income households have access to affordable services, it is also
important to ensure that efforts to realise this objective through service pricing do not result in
unintended and even perverse effects.  For instance, providing various subsidies to connected lower-
income households may result in reduced service expansion rates, and thus be unintentionally
regressive in the longer-run.  Similarly, tariff structures that penalise households that rely upon
multiple-use connections or public water points must be avoided.
•  It is important to design contracts in a way that places the least burden possible on regulatory
authorities.  There are numerous aspects of PSP contracts that have been designed to meet
environmental and social objectives, but which are economically inefficient and/or administratively
costly.  For instance, setting targets to reduce leakage rates while providing raw water at zero cost
places a significant burden on the regulator, and may not be efficient.
•  There must be a high degree of co-ordination between the different agencies that have an impact
upon the regulatory environment of the sector.  One of the advantages of PSP is that it makes choices
and trade-offs between alternative objectives explicit, particularly since there can be important trade-
offs between the realisation of environmental and social objectives.  For instance, excessively stringent
technical specifications for wastewater treatment quality may increase service costs or result in delays
in expansion of the system into poorer uncovered areas.  Thus, responsibilities need to be clearly
established at the outset.
•  Finally, it is important to remember that, with some exceptions, experiences with PSP in the sector
have been concentrated in countries with considerable administrative capacity.  However, in the
coming years it is likely that PSP will grow in importance in countries which have more extreme levels
of urban poverty, are faced with greater environmental constraints, and possess less regulatory
capacity.  The benefits of different forms of PSP need to be weighed against the potential costs if the
public authorities are not able to intervene effectively. Thus, a more pertinent issue than whether or not
there should be PSP, is the precise form which such PSP should take, given existing economic
conditions, sectoral objectives and domestic regulatory capacity.
This last point needs to be emphasised.  In general, the complexity of dealing with environmental and
social objectives complicates the role of the regulator, particularly in developing countries. Where
information is scarce - and it is particularly scarce with respect to household preferences and supply
conditions in poorer neighbourhoods and with respect to environmental conditions and trends in
standards - the regulator must be particularly effective. Since it will be very difficult to identify
appropriate forms of service provision ex ante and since environmental regulations and conditions are
changing quickly in developing countries, some degree of flexibility may have to be introduced in the16
contract in terms of the technical specifications of the services provided, management of collective
systems (including neighbourhood inputs), and the tariff structure.  However, it is important that this
does not undermine the enforceability of the contract.  Balancing trade-offs between the flexibility
needed to ensure that environmental and social objectives are realised and ensuring that private service
providers meet their contractual obligations is one of the most pressing concerns arising from PSP.17
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A.1 Introduction
Due to a widespread perception of public mismanagement of urban water supply and sanitation
systems (WSS), there has been a substantial increase in “formal” private sector participation (PSP) in
the sector in recent years. A World Bank database lists 97 different cases where private sector firms
have taken on a major role in WSS provision in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Between 1990 and
1997 the cumulative new private sector capital expenditures in WSS projects in these regions was $25
billion, compared to $297 million in the period 1984 to 1990. (World Bank, 1998).
Despite the increase in investment by private sector firms and continued efforts on the part of public
authorities, a large proportion of the urban population in developing countries remain unserved. The
UN estimated that, in 1994, close to 300 million urban dwellers were not served by water supplies and
close to 600 million were without sanitation. Many international agencies have reduced their budgets
for WSS since the end of the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1981-1990).
Over the next ten years, the World Bank estimates that $500 billion will be needed for WSS projects.
Many are turning to the private sector as the solution.
However, the experience thus far of large formal private sector service providers helping poor
households gain access at reasonable cost is decidedly mixed. Although many concessions include
explicit contractual arrangements for expansion of the system to unserviced areas (where many of the
poorest households live), in most cases little consideration is given to what households want and can
afford, to local supply conditions and to the viability of existing systems and how these can be
integrated with changes in the sector as a whole. As a consequence, conventional forms of WSS may
be offered which are inappropriate and unaffordable in poorer neighbourhoods. Private companies may
not pursue alternative forms of provision because they have insufficient understanding of them or are
prevented from doing so due to contractual obligations.
The role played by private sector firms in improving environmental conditions is closely tied to their
ability to meet social objectives. If poorer households do not have access to adequate and affordable
water and sanitation, then surface and groundwaters are vulnerable to pollution, and raw water
resources may be exploited  unsustainably. There are other important factors that determine the
environmental consequences of PSP. There is little question that some cities have seen improvements
in wastewater treatment levels and quality as a result of the contractual obligations which companies
have been required to meet. However, in many cases improvements remain potential rather than
actual. Regulatory capacity is key.
This document contains a summary of the proceedings of a workshop held in London on 26-27
November 1998.
1 The purpose of the workshop was to consider efficient and practical ways to realise
social and environmental objectives in light of the increased PSP in urban WSS. The workshop brought
together a range of professional experience and perspectives, with representatives from private firms,
regulatory authorities, network managers, municipalities, development assistance agencies, NGOs and
universities. All those concerned are on a very steep learning curve: European firms are working in
neighbourhoods and in environmental conditions with which they are often unfamiliar; public authorities
are adjusting to becoming “indirect” providers rather than direct managers of WSS systems; and,
development agencies and NGOs are attempting to understand how best to protect the interests of
their intended beneficiaries. Because it is a fast-changing and diverse area, nobody can claim to have a
full understanding of the issues. There is considerable opportunity to learn from each other.
                                                                
1 We are grateful to the financial assistance for the workshop provided by the UK Department for International
Development (DFID) and the Economic Development Institute (EDI) of the World Bank. The Swiss Development
and Cooperation Agency (SDC) also provided valuable funding for the case studies.Annex A
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The first day consisted of presentations of the four case studies (Manila, Buenos Aires/Cordoba,
Abidjan, Mexico City). Each of these were followed by comments from designated discussants, who
were familiar with the cases presented. More general discussion of the specific cases followed.
Because of their length, the case studies have not been included in the proceedings. However, short
summaries have been included to provide a context for the comments and  discussions which follow.
Copies of the full report can be obtained from Nick Johnstone or Libby Wood at IIED.
On the second day, four round-table discussions on more specific issues of particular importance for
the realisation of social and environmental objectives were held. These comprised:
1.  Service differentiation - Opportunities and constraints for service differentiation were discussed
including user preferences, existing informal service providers, technological and managerial issues
and tariff structures.
2.  Management systems in low-income neighbourhoods - This session looked at alternative
management systems in light of service differentiation and the particular characteristics of low-
income areas. In particular, it considered potential relationships between the private company and
user associations/community organisations, NGOs and local government structures, as well as
opportunities for alternative systems of sub-contracting, billing and credit facilities.
3.  Regulation - The third session examined the roles and tasks of the regulatory authority in the
presence of social and environmental objectives, common agency problems and information
constraints.
4.  Bidding procedures and contracts - The final session considered contractual design and bidding
procedures from the perspective of different stakeholders in low income countries.
Each session was introduced by participants who were familiar with the issues. There was, of course,
considerable overlap between the sessions.
These proceedings cannot hope to reflect the full richness of the discussions at the workshop. While
there was considerable disagreement around a number of key issues - which is not surprising given the
complexity of the subject matter and the varied backgrounds of participants - contributions were
uniformly constructive.  Rather than attributing individual points (other than those made by the case
study authors and discussants in the course of their presentations), an overview of discussions on some
of the main points is provided.
Beyond its more general objectives, the workshop had two very specific objectives. First, it provided
an opportunity for the authors of the case studies to obtain feedback from other experts. Second, it
helped the researchers to get a feel for what types of research project would be seen as valuable by
firms, regulators, other public authorities, and, most importantly, the communities affected.
Section A.2 contains a summary of the proceedings and outlines ideas for further research. Section
A.3 summarises the case study presentations and records the discussions that arose from them.
Section A.4 provides an overview of the round-table discussions on specific issues of particular
importance for the realisation of social and environmental objectives. A list of participants and their
contact details is contained in Section A.5.
A.2 Workshop Summary
Discussion throughout the course of the workshop was lively, with all participants making important
contributions. While there was disagreement on a number of points, some general conclusions were
reached on how best to deal with social and environmental concerns when there is PSP in the sector.Annex A
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A.2.1 Regulatory Issues
•  The regulatory requirements implied by the form of PSP adopted should not exceed regulatory
capacity.
•  With PSP the role of government changes from provider to decision maker, necessitating a new
regulatory framework for the sector. The contractual relationships and roles of different agencies
have to become more transparent.
•  The expectations of public authorities and customers are often raised, resulting in demand for
improved environmental performance and increased access for poorer households.
•  Many initiatives to introduce PSP are being undertaken with insufficient attention given to
regulation - governments are relinquishing their role as provider, but are not fulfilling their new role
as regulator.
•  There are trade-offs in the number of regulatory agencies involved in WSS. Although multiple
agencies are able to focus on their specific areas of expertise, common agency problems frequently
occur. Rather than having one decision maker, having one decision-making process may be the best
approach.
•  If regulators are not able to operate independently the wrong incentives may be offered.
•  Irrespective of the regulatory framework, regulators and firms will be faced with incomplete and
inaccurate information, particularly with respect to environmental matters and service provision in
poor areas. The regulatory framework needs to be flexible enough to deal with this.
•  In order to facilitate the regulatory process, there is a strong argument for the integrated
management of WSS.
A.2.2 Bidding Procedures & Contract Design
•  Social and environmental concerns should be on the agenda at the beginning of the process when
clarifying objectives, gathering information and designing the contract. Currently, poor communities
tend to be an afterthought and provision for them within the contract badly planned.
•  The criteria on which contracts are awarded - such as the lowest tariff rate, the largest payment to
public authorities or the greatest levels of investment - are considered by some to be too simplistic.
However, introducing more complex formulae can result in a loss of transparency in the decision-
making process and adds to the cost of the bidding procedure.
•  Bidding systems based on minimum cost may discriminate against the poor since they do not leave
surplus investment money to deal with unforeseen costs in irregular settlements.
•  While many countries are seeking PSP in the sector, before an international firm will even consider
involvement in a developing country, a number of economic and political preconditions must be met.
Similarly, the firm will want to ensure that it is satisfied with contractual details such as technical
objectives, tariff policies and other terms and conditions before it submits an offer.
•  Since uncertainty increases risk and therefore the offer price, it is in everybody’s interest to ensure
that the process is transparent, and reliable information (where it exists) is available.
•  With current bidding procedures, it is often the company that makes the most optimistic evaluation
of the business that wins the contract.  This has resulted in frequent renegotiation of contracts.
•  Since the transaction costs involved in bidding are high, failure to comply with contractual promises
tends to result in the renegotiation of contracts. Renegotiation is becoming more commonplace and
threatens to undermine the bidding process.
A.2.3 Levels of Service Provision
•  There are often clear benefits to be derived from supplying formal WSS to previously unserved
areas. The important thing is to ensure that the private company has an incentive to do so by
coming up with viable institutional, technological, organisational and financial alternatives. Coverage
targets by themselves are not sufficient.Annex A
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•  When incorporating service differentiation as part of a system’s expansion plans it is important that
the service levels provided reflect actual household preferences and budgets, and not the priorities
of the regulators or firms. Moreover, different levels of service provision should be reflected in
tariffs paid.
•  In many cases household connections are not feasible. The reasons for this include inability to pay
or to access credit, insecure land tenure, or technological constraints.
•  If service differentiation is being considered as part of PSP it is important that this does not
undermine the integrity of the system as a whole, or result in environmental and health externalities.
•  It is important to understand the dynamics of existing forms of WSS provision since these can
provide valuable lessons for future developments.
•  Service differentiation must allow for upgrading of technologies in order to cater for increased
demand for improved service provision over time.
•  Firms may be reluctant to provide the types of service with which they are unfamiliar  in
neighbourhoods where they have little experience. Working with other groups (municipal
authorities, NGOs, development agencies) familiar with service provision in low-income
neighbourhoods may be necessary.
•  In some cases firms may find that their comparative advantage is to supply services up to a certain
point, with communities then taking responsibility for financing and operating onward connections.
A.2.4 Management of WSS in Low Income Areas
•  Where possible, communities in low-income areas should be involved at all stages (design to
management) of WSS to develop a sense of ownership, ensure its sustainability and curb illegal
practices such as water tapping.
•  While it is often argued that urban neighbourhoods are unlikely to cooperate in the management of
WSS due to greater instability and heterogeneity relative to rural settlements, this may be
overstated, particularly if there is a widely perceived common interest in cooperating.
•  Examples of “formalised” alternative management systems for WSS in low-income urban areas
are limited.  However, there is a large number of “informal” management systems.  While many of
these may be exploitative (e.g. vendors with local “monopolies” on service provision), others have
proved to be effective.
•  Firms with coverage targets incorporating low-income areas should consider alternative
management systems. Responsibilities such as tariff collection may be easier with delegated
management structures. In addition, where a common raw water source is shared by the formal
and informal sectors (or where raw water quality is affected by inadequate sanitation), the firm will
have a strong incentive to enter into a contractual relationship with the communities represented by
the informal sector.
•  The management of the point where the formal service provider meets the informal service
provider raises important contractual questions. For example, it is important to be clear about the
point at which the firm ceases to bear responsibility for water quality and reliability.
A.2.5 Further Research
Drawing on discussions held during the workshop, a number of ideas for further research were
identified.
WSS for Poor Urban Households in Low Income Countries: Assessing Demand
It was clear from discussions that there is a need for empirical work on demand for WSS amongst
poor urban households/neighbourhoods. The key objectives for such a study are to:
•  determine whether or not recent discussions about “service differentiation” are based more
on the priorities of public authorities and private firms, or on the preferences of households
themselves; andAnnex A
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•  examine what already exists in terms of WSS service provision before proposing
improvements since in many cases existing forms of service provision can provide the
institutional (and occasionally technological) basis for service expansion.
The Integration of Formal and Informal Private Sector Water and Sanitation Provision in
Urban Areas
A study to assess how best to incorporate the needs and preferences of lower-income households
when encouraging formal PSP in WSS provision would be useful to all stakeholders. In particular, the
study should take into account the opportunities offered by:
•  contractual arrangements;
•  financial incentives and the possibility for cross subsidisation;
•  low-cost technologies; and,
•  alternative institutional arrangements.
Designing Private Sector Participation in Water Supply and Sanitation in Light of Regulatory
Constraints
In many countries, regulatory capacity (independence, information,  experience) will not be sufficient
for effective regulation of PSP in WSS. While undoubtedly important, concerted effort from national
and international policy makers is unlikely to overcome all of these inadequacies. In many cases it may
be more realistic to design PSP in light of these constraints in order to reduce the importance of
inadequate regulation and internalise the incentives. This includes more appropriate forms of PSP,
bidding procedures, contract design and regulatory frameworks.
A.3 Proceedings - 26th November
A.3.1 Manila, Philippines
Presentation of Case Study Paper by Christina David (Philippine Institute for Development
Studies, Makati City)
In 1997, the Metro Manila Water and Sewerage System (MWSS) was put out to tender. The decision
to introduce PSP was motivated by a commitment to improve the efficiency of MWSS operations,
raise financial resources for investments and end government subsidies. Prior to privatisation, the
MWSS service was characterised by low water  pressure, high rates of non-revenue water,
intermittent supply and low coverage rates. MWSS services accounted for approximately 60% of total
water usage in Manila. The remaining supply has been obtained from privately-owned wells, causing
problems of groundwater depletion.
The form of PSP chosen was a 25-year concession agreement. In order to promote competition and
generate yardstick information, the service area was divided into East and West zones and
concessions were granted to two different companies. A residual MWSS was retained to carry out
limited management and facilitation roles. In addition, a separate Regulatory Office was established.
Prior to privatisation, the MWSS raised water tariffs to increase the likelihood that the average tariff
would be lower after privatisation and thus make the shift more acceptable to the public. The two
concessions were granted to those companies who promised the lowest tariff levels. Since different
rates were submitted, a higher bid price had to be accepted in the West zone and consequently the
price of water differs substantially between the two zones.
The concessionaires are required to expand coverage of water supply, sewerage, and sanitation
services and to provide a 24-hour supply to all connections by the year 2000. By 2006,  a 96%
coverage is expected. In low-income areas, the concessionaires are obliged to establish one publicAnnex A
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standpipe per 50 households. Sewer connection coverage is scheduled to increase from 7% to 62% by
2021. In the meantime, a sanitation service (desludging of septic tanks every five to seven years) will
be used. The costs of expanded sewerage will be passed on to the consumers.
In addition to increased efficiency,  PSP’s potentially major contributions to environmental objectives
relate to its attempts to internalise the externalities caused by water consumption through full cost
recovery pricing. Cost recovery will also provide users with incentives to reduce water consumption.
In addition, there will be stricter enforcement of environmental standards related to WSS because the
environmental regulator is sufficiently funded and dedicated to this cause.
However, there are a number of shortcomings in the concession agreement relating to social and
environmental objectives, in particular:
•  Coverage targets exclude those who obtain water from  privately-owned wells and waterworks
located in areas where the MWSS water service is unreliable/non-existent. In addition, the
agreement does not specify whether or not coverage includes commercial and industrial
establishments.
•  The concessionaires have initially adopted the MWSS increasing block tariff structure. This system
penalises many of the poor who share water connections. Moreover, the higher water tariffs for
commercial and business establishments promote self-supplied groundwater pumping, thereby
exacerbating its depletion.
•  It is suggested that water demand projections have been underestimated. If this is so, it is likely to
be the poor who will not gain access. This again will lead to increasing reliance on privately-owned
wells or waterworks and a worsening of groundwater depletion.
•  The pricing policy does not take full account of the opportunity cost of water or the cost of
externalities in water production and consumption. There is no bulk water fee charged on the raw
water use despite competing uses among irrigation, urban use and electricity generation. As such,
the policy is likely to lead to a misallocation of water resources in favour of lower valued uses, a
worsening of groundwater depletion and wasteful usage of water.
Comments by Reynaldo Vea (Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System, Regulatory
Office, Quezon City)
Tariff Adjustments
It was pointed out that while the timing was fortuitous the tariff adjustments which took place in
Manila prior to privatisation were made in order to comply with the requirements of loan covenants on
the return on the base rate, not to make privatisation politically acceptable.
Non-revenue Water
In terms of operational efficiency, the single biggest issue confronting the concessionaires is that of
non-revenue water (NRW). No targets were set for a reduction in NRW in the concession agreement;
it was felt that this was not necessary since it would be in the concessionaires’ interests to reduce it.
Moreover, the competitiveness of the bids depended on each bidder’s confidence in their capacity to
address the problem.
Immediately prior to privatisation, NRW stood at 57%. It is unofficially estimated that a 5% reduction
in NRW was achieved in the first year of privatisation. The two concessionaires have deployed twice
as many leak repair teams as the old MWSS, eliminating the backlog of leak repair works within a few
months of take-over and improving response times to complaints regarding leaks. They have also made
progress in regulating illegal connections.
Service ExpansionAnnex A
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The extent to which the urban poor will benefit from privatisation primarily depends on the attainment
of overall coverage targets. However, the agreements do not reveal how service to the urban poor will
be prioritised. Targets are only expressed at the level of the municipality and the concessionaires are
left to plan the expansion of distribution networks. It is felt that the concessionaires, in trying to meet
their targets, are likely to prioritise the most densely populated areas. The ultimate objective is that of
“almost universal” coverage aimed for by the year 2006. If this is achieved almost everyone,
regardless of their socio-economic status, will have access to safe potable water at adequate pressure
at all times of the day.
Groundwater Depletion
The concession agreement does seek to address the issue of groundwater depletion, a persistent
problem under MWSS. Prior to privatisation, MWSS supported applications for the construction of
deep wells in areas where MWSS was not able to provide water. Such applications were supported on
the condition that when the MWSS service did become available, the deepwells would be shut down.
This was accepted because MWSS water, which is mainly drawn from surface waters, was usually
less expensive and of better quality. The same approach has been adopted in the concession. It is felt
that since the concessionaires have exclusive rights over water distribution in Metro Manila and since
coverage targets include those areas currently using  deepwells, the concession agreement will
satisfactorily address the problem of groundwater depletion.
Service Coverage and Water Supply
It is forecast that present capacity of the system of 3,200 megalitres will double by 2005. (This does
not take into account the additional water to be made available by the reduction in NRW).  It is
expected that this should cover demand arising from increased service coverage.
General Discussion
Privatisation was generally well accepted by the public because of the perceived benefits to be gained.
The significantly higher tariff rate charged in the Western concession zone caused annoyance at the
outset. However, this annoyance subsided as people realised they were still paying less than
previously. From the regulator’s perspective, once the offers were submitted, the differing bid rates
and resulting tariff prices could not have been avoided without damaging the integrity of the bidding
process.
A.3.2 Buenos Aires, Argentina
Presentation of Case Study Paper by Sergio Mazuchelli (IIED - América Latina) and Martín
Rodríguez (CEER - Instituto de Economía)
After decades of inadequate and inefficient public sector provision, private sector firms were invited to
bid for water and sanitation concessions in a number of Argentinean cities in the early 1990s, including
Buenos Aires and Cordoba. In the case of Buenos Aires, a 30-year concession for the provision of
WSS was won by a consortium of nine companies, ‘Aguas Argentinas’, led by Lyonnaise des Eaux. In
Cordoba a concession was won by a similar consortium, but does not include sanitation services. Local
firms play a minority but important role in both consortia. Regulators have been set up, bringing
together representatives from different levels of government.
Amongst other objectives (i.e. reduced public deficits, increased investment levels, increased service
efficiency) it was hoped that the involvement of private sector firms would result in the attainment of a
number of environmental (improved wastewater treatment, reduced unaccounted-for-water, reduced
groundwater contamination and depletion, etc…) and social (improved access to affordable water and
sanitation for lower-income households and neighbourhoods) objectives which the public sector
provider had been unable to achieve satisfactorily.  While it is still early days, it would appear thatAnnex A
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progress has been made towards reaching a number of these objectives.  For instance, the proportion
of unaccounted-for-water is falling, the system is expanding into poorer  neighbourhoods, and
wastewater treatment volumes and levels are improving.
However, there has been a number of significant shortcomings.  It is clear that a golden opportunity to
reform an administratively cumbersome, economically inefficient and (to a certain extent) socially
inequitable tariff structure has been lost.  In addition, there has been a lack of co-ordination between a
number of the public authorities concerned (local municipalities  vs higher levels of government,
environmental regulators vs economic regulators), particularly with respect to wastewater collection,
treatment and disposal.  More generally, concerns have been raised about the capacity and
independence of the regulatory authorities.
Significantly, in some cases improvements have been achieved in spite of the design of PSP, rather
than because of it. For instance, plans for service expansion into some of the “villas miserias” would
have involved connection charges of $1,000. Belatedly realising that this was not feasible,  Aguas
Argentinas has been working with other groups to develop alternative technological and management
systems which will better meet the demands of the households concerned.  Recently, tariffs have been
reformed with the connection fee for new users being replaced by a surcharge on all users. None of
this was in the design of the technical and financial parameters of the concession and nor was it
foreseen by the provider in drawing up its investment plans. Addressing these problems at the outset
requires better information and better co-ordination, but is likely to result in more credible concessions
which better reflect the priorities of the users.
Comments by Francois Kaisin (Aguas Argentinas)
Accuracy of the Data
During the short time (three months) which was available to prepare the offer in 1993,  Aguas
Argentinas did the best job possible with the technical knowledge available at the time and with the
information provided by the Argentinean government. However, during the five years that followed the
signing of the contract, Aguas Argentinas learned, both from experinece and from a large number of
studies, that it was not possible to continue the contract as initially agreed.
The main lesson learned by Aguas Argentinas is the importance of checking the accuracy of the
information available at the offer stage. For example, it was agreed with the government that people in
many of the areas covered by service expansion could pay for water and sewerage connections.
However, it soon became evident that these were not affordable to a large proportion of the population
and that alternative instruments would have to be used.
Similarly,  Aguas Argentinas were not warned of all relevant forthcoming legislative changes. For
example, it was agreed in the contract that sludge could be dumped during the first 20 years of the
Concession. However, shortly after the contract was signed, the legislation changed such that all the
sludge management had to be carried out on land through incineration, landfill etc... The implications of
this were that Aguas Argentina were faced with higher investment and operating costs than they had
initially envisaged.
Dialogue with Stakeholders
Another difficulty experienced by Aguas Argentinas was that there was not as much dialogue as they
would have liked between the various parties involved, including the public authorities, residents,
NGOs. This was likely to cause a number of problems during the evolution of the concession. Aguas
Argentinas has, nevertheless, noted some progress in this respect, but recognises that there is still a
long way to go.Annex A
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Comments by Miguel Otero (Municipalidad de San Fernando, Buenos Aires)
Officials in the Municipality of San Fernando feel there has been insufficient consultation with local
authorities and residents and that this has led to a number of misinformed judgements in the
formulation of the WSS Master Plan.
According to the Plan, a wastewater treatment plant was to be built in San Fernando despite
significant environmental and technical problems regarding construction of the plant and the laying of
pipes from neighbouring districts. In addition, the Plan prioritised those areas which were best placed
to pay for the service. According to the Plan only 18,000 out of 150,000 inhabitants in San Fernando
were to be served in the first ten years of the concession. The municipality is not satisfied with this
target, believing that full coverage of their area could be attained in seven rather than 15 years. In
particular, they argue that residents in the area are currently paying up to $100/month for sanitation
because they have septic tanks and have to pay for emptying by truck once or twice a month. The
municipality believes that residents would end up paying far less if they had proper connections.
Through discussions with  Aguas Argentinas and the regulatory authority (ETOSS), the municipality




It was pointed out that the Buenos Aires contract does not allow for direct competition in the market
for service provision, although this is true of most concessions in the sector. However, this is
compounded by the fact that ETOSS is not generally seen to be an effective regulator and the contract
is not considered to be well-designed. It was argued that more effective incentives could be built in to
the contract, making regulation less cumbersome.
A.3.3 Mexico City, Mexico
Presentation of Case Study Paper by Lilian Saade (IHE, Netherlands)
In 1992, the Federal District Water Commission was created with the task of engaging PSP in the
Federal District of Mexico City through multiple, multi-stage service contracts for water supply. The
policy adopted in 1992 by Mexico’s Federal District authorities focuses on two main strategies aimed
at reducing lapses and deficiencies in the provision of water services: to implement universal water
metering for the assessment of customer bills, and to significantly improve the water distribution
infrastructure. Financial problems had resulted from the system of fixed and highly subsidised tariffs,
the lack of a payment culture and high levels of leakage. These problems were in turn leading to
insufficient investment in infrastructure and to a deterioration in water services. Moreover, excessive
demand was rapidly drawing down the aquifer under the city, causing the city centre to sink by several
meters.
Given the lack of information regarding the customer base, water consumption levels and network
conditions, a phased approach to PSP was considered most appropriate. The Federal District was
divided into four contractual zones and 10-year general contracts awarded to four separate consortia
following an international bidding process. The tasks of the consortia were to be accomplished in the
following three phases:
Phase I: Carry out a census to identify and register customers, install meters and produce network
plans;
Phase II: Read and maintain the installed meters; design and implement customer billing systems;
calculate, print and distribute water bills; set up new connections; and
Phase III: Operate, maintain and rehabilitate the water distribution and drainage networks.Annex A
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The responsibility for water is shared by a number of public organisations. Having so many entities
involved in the running of water operations causes certain problems and although in theory each
agency has a distinct role to play, in practice duplication and overlap often occur. Moreover, there is a
poor flow of information,  which presents a potentially serious financial problem.
The transition to PSP has achieved several goals. Although some users associate PSP with higher
tariffs and therefore oppose it, the change to metered consumption is one of the most significant
achievements. In addition, substantial improvements have been made with the customer database,
metering and billing. The staged approach allows some flexibility for mistakes to be corrected and
adjustments made to cater for unexpected situations. Dividing the city into four zones has reduced the
risk of private investment monopoly.
Although service contracts have been successful, they have not achieved some important performance
improvements and there have been delays in their implementation.  In general, PSP in Mexico has
tended to rely upon ad hoc arrangements.
Comments by Robert Hearne (CATIE, Costa Rica)
Water Supply and Demand
Given its location, ensuring an adequate water supply for the residents of Mexico City is problematic.
There are large transfers of water from outside the valleys and from other users. Water demand
management through the introduction of metering (as stipulated in the WSS contract) should bring
important environmental benefits to Mexico City. Prior to PSP, there was little incentive to limit water.
Wastewater Reuse
Concerns were expressed about the use of wastewater in selected irrigation systems.  It was pointed
out that strict controls had to be applied to ensure that health effects (particularly cholera) were
avoided.  Crop choice was also considered to be important.
Financial Management
A shortcoming of the Mexico City contract is that too many organisations are involved in managing the
financial aspects of water services. Revenue is collected by one agency, deposited in the Central
Treasury and then used by another agency. This reduces the financial incentive to improve the quality
of the service since the link between payment and service is lost.
Competition and Regulation
The division of Mexico City into four zones under the responsibility of four companies should in the
long run help public authorities regulate the sector effectively.
Unforeseen Events
The constitutional changes (with a democratically elected government now in power) and violent
currency fluctuations have significantly affected the plan for private sector involvement. Although
these events cannot be predicted, it was argued that the requirement that there be domestic investors




Members of a research group from the London School for Tropical Hygiene and Medicine have been
carrying out epidemiological studies of the wastewater reuse system in Mexico for the past ten years.Annex A
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These studies have found that the principal health risk is faced not by consumers but by agricultural
workers and their families. (Contact Sandy Cairncross).
Social Impacts
The contract area of the concession does not include millions of poorer people who live in adjoining
parts of the State of Mexico, many of whom depend on inadequate WSS services. Unless
complementary investments are undertaken, by excluding this area PSP will not address many of the
problems associated with providing services to poorer households.
A.3.4 Abidjan, Côte D’Ivoire
Case Study Report by Ake N’Gbo (CREMIDE, University of Abidjan)
2
Since independence,  water distribution in Côte d’Ivoire has been carried out by private company,
SODECI. In 1974 SODECI was granted a 15-year lease contract for the entire country giving it
responsibility for distributing water and collecting revenue on behalf of the State. The State remained
responsible for investment decisions but soon ran into financial difficulties. In 1987, in an attempt to
overcome these difficulties, SODECI was awarded a 20-year concession for the country’s water
supply networks. The new convention improved the co-ordination between investment and operating
needs with SODECI administering the investment funds itself. SODECI does not have investment
obligations but can carry out smaller investments. The Government also pays royalties to SODECI for
maintaining sanitation facilities. A concession contract is currently being prepared in which users will
pay SODECI directly for sanitation services.
Water, sanitation and the environment fall under the authority of a number of different ministries who
intervene in devising water policy, controlling the concession and financing works. Regulation of the
water sector is divided between the Water Division and the Ministry of Economy and Finance. A new
environmental code was implemented in 1996 and a National Water Law is currently being drafted. A
shortcoming of the regulatory framework is the lack of co-ordination between the different ministries
and the environmental and water policies.
The water tariff is uniform throughout Côte d’Ivoire. A proportion of water revenue goes towards the
National Water Fund (intended to reimburse loans to the benefit of the water and sanitation sector)
and the Water Development Fund (administered by SODECI and used to finance social connections,
renewal works, extension and new investments). SODECI’s revenues are calculated on the basis of
operating costs with a contractual margin of 5% for the operator.
Approximately 90% of  SODECI’s service subscribers could be categorised as economically
disadvantaged and consume very low volumes of water. The Government, in conjunction with
SODECI, has implemented a socially equitable rate structure. In some cases social connections are
free. The number of subsidised connections has increased from 14,681 in 1987 to 30,334 in 1997.
However, a proportion of the population remains unconnected to the water network since they cannot
afford the connection costs or are unable to save with the regularity required for the three-monthly
billing system. In peri-urban areas SODECI works with retailers who supply water to low income
unconnected consumers. Retailers pay a deposit to SODECI and subscribe for an industrial use
connection (this effectively represents the privatisation of resale). In general, the retail price is higher.
The SODECI experience appears to have been a success and indeed has come to represent a model
for the rest of Africa. Significant gains in efficiency and coverage have been recorded and PSP has
                                                                
2 Ake N’Gbo was unfortunately unable to attend the workshop.Annex A
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led to an increase in the number of subsidised connections. However, a number of shortcomings can
be identified:
•  The uniform tariff rate will lead to a misallocation of resources (to the detriment of the
residents of Abidjan where water supply is cheapest) and may have negative
environmental impacts.
•  Cost-plus regulation can lead to difficulties since it does not always offer an incentive to
reduce costs and is expensive to regulate (resulting in increased costs to consumers).
•  The social tariff is effectively a block-tariff system. As noted in the Manila case study,
block tariffs penalise those low-income households who are dependent on collective water
supply.
Comments by  Djouka  Anzeni ( Directeur de L’Eau, Abidjan) and  Mamadou Sakho
(Directeur-Adjoint de L’Eau, Abidjan)
With regard to WSS provision, the Government would like to see the following developments:
•  Improvement of the administrative and tariff setting procedures
•  Decentralisation of decision making, including public water education programmes
•  Greater co-ordination between the different institutions involved in WSS
•  Finalisation and introduction of a water law
General Discussion
SODECI is not subject to competition in the market and may not even be subject to competition when
the contract expires. When the contract was put out to international tender in 1987 all the major
French companies showed initial interest but withdrew when they realised how well-placed SODECI
was.  In addition, since the 5% profit margin is already declared at the outset, there is no competitive
tendering over tariff pricing.
A.4 Proceedings - 27th November
A.4.1 Social and Environmental Implications of Service Differentiation
Service differentiation implies the provision of different levels and types of service within a single
network. For instance, some households may be served by household connections, while others are
served by yard taps or collective water points. One of the motivating factors for service differentiation
is the difference in costs between different levels of services. For example, it is evident from WHO
and UNICEF data that the average per capita investment and maintenance cost of household
connections is 50% greater than for public tap connections. Similarly, alternative on-site sewerage
systems are often far cheaper than conventional systems.  If these differences are reflected in costs
borne by the household, then service differentiation may reflect households’ preferences.
Introduction by Sandy Cairncross (London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine)
Domestic consumption of water differs according to the type of service available. For example, it has
been found that up to a point, water consumption increases as its source is brought closer to the home.
However, between 100 yards and a kilometre, consumption is relatively constant and then increases
sharply when water is provided to the house or in very close proximity to the house. This increase in
consumption in close proximity to the house has important distributional and health implications.
Many low income households already rely on the private sector for their water supply, purchasing it
from private vendors. Although there is very limited information available on the size and nature of the
informal sector, vended water is known to be often more expensive and the total revenue collected
higher, than in the formal supply network.Annex A
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If service differentiation is being considered as part of PSP, it is important to understand the dynamics
of the existing informal water markets. For example, a number of studies have found a very inelastic
demand for water. This implies that if the availability of water is increased, the price will decrease
substantially.  Moreover, the income elasticity of water is also generally found to be low.  Since
expenditure on water represents a very high proportion of total expenditure for poorer households, a
decrease in the price of water will result in an increase in financial resources available for food,
bringing about important nutritional benefits.
In terms of sanitation, service differentiation is more complicated since a broad array of technologies
can be used, ranging from conventional sewerage to on-site systems which dispose of the sewerage
into a pit or soak-away system. Different systems will place very different demands on water supply.
While water provision tends to be in the public domain, the relationship between the private and public
spheres is particularly complicated in the case of sanitation. Since many forms of sanitation employed
by poorer households can be provided privately, it tends to be more difficult to generate demand for
public sanitation programmes. This is problematic since the public environmental and health benefits of
effective service provision and drainage are considerable. However, household benefits including those
relating to privacy, social status and health benefits do make sanitation a private good for which people
are willing to pay.
General Discussion
Standardised or differentiated services?
In recent years there has been a shift in thinking in policy circles, with the case for service
differentiation (rather than standardisation) being made quite forcefully.  However, service
differentiation necessarily implies differing levels of service convenience, quality, etc... Thus, when
advocating service differentiation it is important that it is a reflection of authentic differences in
households’ preferences and their willingness to pay for different services.  The introduction of service
differentiation should not arise from a desire to protect the vested interests of NGOs to promote
“collective” solutions, from the priorities of public authorities to reduce externalities, or from the private
firms to meet their expansion targets. Assessment of users’ demand is vital.
However, since in many cases it is not feasible to provide household connections and since many
households will not be willing to pay for the costs involved, it is important to acknowledge the
significant benefits to be derived from alternative solutions, such as public taps, relative to the status
quo. In WaterAid’s experience in rural areas, women will realise tangible benefits if public taps are
provided in safe areas close to the home. In urban areas, although a number of factors other than
distance affect people’s preferences, providing public taps in sufficiently close proximity to homes is
even more feasible given the higher population density relative to rural areas.
The issue of household connections versus standpoints is not limited to willingness to pay; other factors
such as land tenure and the ability to officially connect irregular areas to the main network are also
important. For example, in areas where land tenure is relatively secure, people are more likely to fund
their own household connections. In Dhaka, where land tenure is insecure and it is politically unfeasible
for household connections to be made, people are paying for the capital investment and running costs
of public tap stands on a credit basis.
In terms of sanitation, it was argued that public/communal latrines are not a satisfactory solution to
inadequate access in many areas. Communal sanitation cannot be used by children, elderly people or
women at night. Households need something in or near their dwelling.
How to provide efficient WSS services in poor areasAnnex A
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Moving into lower-income neighbourhoods is a complicated and expensive business for water
companies, not only because of the cost of service provision but also because of additional
complications such  as  land tenure issues, non-payment of bills etc... Moreover, there may be
disincentives for a firm to provide services in a neighbourhood where the majority want water points
but a few households want private connections. Special regulatory functions and other measures will
be needed to ensure these difficulties are effectively overcome. If there are clear benefits to be
derived from supplying water to areas which were previously unserved, the most important thing is to
ensure that the private provider has an incentive to do so.
The following suggestions were made for overcoming constraints and increasing the efficiency of
WSS in low-income areas:
•  Land tenure - The financial problems of accessing credit are usually at the core of difficulties in
ensuring access for the poor. In particular, insecure tenure can pose difficulties since legal tenure
of land is often interpreted as an indicator of credit worthiness. Moreover, households with tenure
are able to incorporate the costs of connection into their own capital rather than investing in
someone else’s property. Mechanisms should be explored which allow community groups in illegal
settlements to secure access to credit to pay for the capital costs of service provision.
 
•  Institutional - Rather than dealing directly with households, in some neighbourhoods it may be
necessary to establish what types of groups with whom the private providers are able to develop
commercial relations, e.g. NGOs, user groups, the municipality.
 
•  Organisational - The idea of concentric circles (household, city and beyond) was considered a
useful conceptual tool. There are examples of authorities or private companies supplying up to a
certain point with communities taking responsibility for financing and developing services beyond.
Rather than being a direct provider, the company may have to have some oversight capacity. The
regulator’s role may also be affected.
 
•  Understanding demand - It is essential that the preferences of poorer users are understood if they
are to be provided for efficiently. Unfortunately, this does not tend to be the case at present. For
example, in Manila, the concession contract states that one public standpipe per 50 households
should be provided and  that households should not be charged for the connection costs. This
arrangement is not ideal since the concessionaires will meet their minimum requirements rather
than taking households’ preferences into account. Households may well be willing to pay for more
standpipe connections to save the cost of the inconvenience of having to queue for a standpost
shared by 50 households.
 
•  The heterogeneity of poor areas (from wealthy merchants to the unemployed) should be exploited.
Cross-subsidy arrangements within areas can be set up, related not just to the water tariff but also
to the connection charge. For example, the richest traders can pay for the main piping, with others
paying for the secondary distribution network, and poorer households just having to pay connection
fees.
 
•  Collection of payment - Provided that appropriate institutional mechanisms are in place, cost
recovery is no more of a problem in poor urban areas than in rich. For example, in La Paz, Bolivia,
a cost recovery rate of 98% has been achieved in poor areas. Non-payment is often attributable to
the fact that low household consumption rates in poor areas means that the cost of installing a
meter, checking the reading, preparing and sending the bill and recovering the money for one poor
household is often not viable. However, this can be overcome. For example, one way of dealing
with the problem of small bills is to move from household to community billing and to leave
communities to manage billing internally.Annex A
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•  Allow for upgrading - Improvements in living standards over time will result in the demand for
improved services. The infrastructure built will therefore need to be such that it can be upgraded to
cater for future demand. The current manner in which the private sector is involved does not
always provide incentives to build excess capacity.
 
A.4.2 Management Systems in Low Income Areas
In this session two projects in low-income areas (Nairobi and Port-au-Prince) were explored to review
the potential for alternative forms of service management, particularly those in which poorer
households and neighbourhoods play an active role.
Case of Nairobi Presented by  Munguti Katui Katua (Community Management & Training
Services, Nairobi)
In 1997, under the umbrella of a larger World Bank project, a water project aimed at creating a supply
network began in a slum settlement in Nairobi. By the end of the project, it is expected that valuable
lessons will have been learned for providing water supply to the slum settlements in Nairobi. The
project involves co-operation between Nairobi City Council, a private consulting firm, a private
contractor and community management services.
The settlement is probably the largest in Nairobi and has a high population density with 700,000 people
living in 25 hectares. It has no formal water supply but is surrounded by high-income areas serviced
with household connections. The main constraint to formal supply within the slum area is insecure land
tenure which makes it politically unfeasible for Nairobi City Council to provide services since in doing
so they would legalise the settlement. As a consequence, members of the community rely on illegal
tapping of water from neighbouring areas up to two kilometres away.
The slum area was not initially included in the larger project. However, it was soon realised that if the
informal sector were not involved in water supply improvements, water would continue to be tapped
illegally. As an afterthought to the project, an “alternative management system” has been set up
involving extensive consultation with the community. It was felt that this had to recognise people’s
ability and willingness-to-pay for services. Thus, inhabitants of the slum area are expected to pay for
water and determine the appropriate management systems for organising supply within the area.
Discussions are currently underway to decide how best to link up this alternative management system
with the authorities. However, negotiations are complicated by the fact that the Government
administration does not want to participate because of the issue of title deeds for the land. As a
starting point, a measure of ownership within the community was created through community
participation in the surveying process. The community assisted in identifying suitable areas to lay pipes
and in decisions concerning those structures that were obstacles. It was decided that all work carried
out by the contractors within the slum area must involve local labour (selected by the community).
Nairobi City Council, as owner of the project, wants to streamline operations such as licensing and
monitoring. Other issues also need to be resolved such as where the “master meters” will go, how
they will know whether the meters are functioning and how they will link up to operators from outside
the slum area. The intention is to create village committees comprising people they trust who will be
involved in the processing of applications and liaising with the City Council. Through discussion groups,
the community are deciding who should be responsible for managing the system within the slum area,
including defining the role of different interest groups e.g. women’s groups, water kiosk owners,
landlords with water points and the local accepted leadership.Annex A
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The design is now complete, and nine of the anticipated 27 kilometres of pipeline in the slum area has
been laid. However, tapping through illegal connections is continuing despite these developments. As
soon as the new water supply is connected, all the existing lines - legal and illegal - will be
disconnected and everybody will have to apply anew through committees. The community would like
tariffs to be determined by market forces and they believe that they will be below the existing rate.
Case of Port-au-Prince Presented by Bernard Collignon (Hydro Conseil, France)
Port-au-Prince is the capital of Haiti and has a population of two million. Haiti is the poorest country in
the Americas and over the past 40 years much of the country’s service infrastructure has
disintegrated. Public water supply is lacking and the majority of the people in low-income areas obtain
water from private operators or rivers.
In Port-au-Prince a long chain of private operators are involved in the supply of water; managers of
private boreholes supply water to trucks who then carry it to private standpipes. The price at the end
of the chain is high ($3 per cm), water quality is poor, and service is sporadic. With support from the
community, Hydro  Conseil have looked at ways of improving the water supply in Port-au-Prince
restoring some kind of regulation.
Since any attempt to supply water formally through household connections comes up against land
tenure problems, alternative supply solutions were sought. The key issue was to find a way to connect
Port-au-Prince with the formal water network supplying the city to eliminate the need for trucks. For
this it was necessary to build new water tanks inside the slums and to improve the existing piping in the
community.
The solution has involved dividing the management of the network into two parts - the main pipes
which run very near to the Port-au-Prince slums and community-managed distribution pipes - with a
master meter located between the two.
Although the communities have different needs and preferences, they cooperate since they share the
common interest of obtaining more and better water for the slum. The communities decide amongst
themselves who is going to represent them, although this is not necessarily through democratic means.
Water is distributed to standpipes which are managed by private resale. If price, quality and operating
hours are not accepted, the community has the right to remove the management team. There was no
real economic basis to tariff setting; a reasonable price was simply decided upon. It was originally set
at $3 per m
3 but in three years has decreased to $1.5- $2 per m
3.
With assistance from donors, the programme is now operating in 20 slums covering approximately
400,000 people. Moreover, the system has been operating for three years with no financial problems
and the bills charged by the public utilities have been paid. The programme has successfully introduced
a degree of regulation to the market. Although many people rely on public resale rather than the
standpipes, the prices are similar. This form of management - private standpipe resellers alongside
those who manage the system at the level of the slums - does have problems. Ideally there should be
some form of oversight of the entire management process by a local council.
An unanticipated benefit of the project is the increasing confidence and support from the public utility
towards the programme. Previously, the authority was very sceptical about the feasibility of working in
the slums.
General Discussion
Implications of community management for formal PSPAnnex A
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Examples of the type discussed above, where poor urban areas are integrated with the formal systems
through community management, are limited in number. However from the firm’s perspective it is
something they must consider since all firms with coverage targets are going to come into contact with
existing systems and will need to have an idea of how they will deal with their positive and negative
elements. From the communities’ perspective, they need to consider how they are going to interact
with the firm.
Moreover, the inequity of the fees paid for water by the poor versus the rich in urban areas is largely a
consequence of the mark-up charged by informal vendors for the transportation, metering and
distribution of water. Large companies are able to benefit from economies of scale with regard to the
provision of transport, but face difficulties in metering and receiving payment for water in poor areas.
In many cases, the optimal solution would appear to be for firms to bring water to a certain point and
then to legally subcontract someone to distribute the water beyond that point, and manage operations
and payments.
Where illegal tapping is prevalent or a common source is shared by the formal and informal sectors,
the firm will have a strong incentive to enter into a contractual relationship with the communities
represented by the informal sector.
Master meters
The issue of the master meter - the point where the formal meets the informal system - raises
important questions about privatisation. For example, what are the implications of a private company
deciding that rather than having a contractual relationship with individual households it is preferable to
have a contractual relationship at the master meter with whatever authority has management
responsibility? Does this imply that the private company is not responsible for anything that happens
beyond the master meter? It is quite likely that they would be held liable, for example, for agreements
made regarding water pressure and quality.
A discussion ensued about the appropriate means of setting tariffs at the master meter. For example,
in Haiti, the price charged at the master meter is 20% lower than the price charged to households.
A.4.3 Economic Regulation
Regulation of a concession should theoretically be straightforward because all of the terms, conditions
and standards should be included in the contract. The role of the regulator is simply to ensure that
these are met. If for any reason they are not, there is usually a performance bond which puts pressure
on the company to make sure that they do not infringe those conditions in the future. However, in
practice, as is clear from the following discussion, a number of factors may undermine the regulatory
process.
Introduction by Dominic Moran (Ove Arup, UK)
PSP in WSS involves transferring the risk from the public to private sphere. As soon as a privatised
operator is introduced it necessitates the presence of an independent operator to regulate and protect
the private and common interests of users and of the private operator.
WSS was privatised in England and Wales in 1989. Prior to privatisation, Regional Water Associations
and smaller water companies had been responsible for setting prices and dealing with environmental
considerations. The system had its shortcomings and its performance in terms of investment and
environmental protection was not as good as it could have been. However, the system did allow for
economies of scope to arise from integrated river basin management.Annex A
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Post-privatisation, the National Rivers Authority (which in 1994 became the Environment Agency
(EA)) was established as the environmental regulator in charge of abstraction licensing, discharge
consents and water quality. Economic and social regulation (including pricing and yardstick
competition) became the responsibility of the Office for Water Services (OFWAT) as a separate
statutory body. Problems have been experienced in trying to integrate the OFWAT agenda with the
EA agenda and in reconciling the objectives of two regulators.
Introduction by Michael Massey (Environment Directorate, UK Department for Trade and
Industry)
One of the motivations behind privatisation of WSS in England and Wales was to separate the
‘gamekeeper’ from the ‘poacher’ and to form an independent regulatory body. Water in England and
Wales is characterised by a series of de facto local monopolies. Consequently, although a certain
degree of competition has been introduced, there are severe limitations on its extent. Alternative
mechanisms are therefore needed to replace the incentive disciplines that would operate with greater
competition.
After the first few years, it was felt that the regulatory system was working well from an economic
perspective, but was not dealing adequately with the social and environmental impacts of the WSS
utilities. As a consequence a number of changes will be made. The regulator’s duty will be changed to
focus primarily on consumers. In addition, while the importance of having an arms-length relationship
between the regulator and government was recognised, a method was needed to ensure that the
regulator met social and environmental objectives. Through extensive public consultation, it was
decided that the primary focus of the regulator would remain economic but that Government would
give guidance to the regulator. The regulator would have a statutory duty to take this guidance into
account. Thus it was decided that social and environmental objectives were for the government, and
not OFWAT, to set.
General Discussion
Impact of PSP
In many cases in developing countries, there is simply no established regulatory framework able to
oversee a sector in which private firms are active. Where a framework exists, it may not be coherent
and may be in a transitory state. One thing that privatisation has done - for better or worse - is to have
forced several important issues to be discussed seriously, where previously the public sector had
fudged issues and muddled along. The contractual relationships and roles of different agencies have
had to become more transparent in terms of who is doing what and how they relate to each other.
The expectations of regulators and customers changes with PSP. Both are more likely to tolerate a
poor service from government rather than from the private sector. For example, from a regulatory
perspective, in England and Wales while WSS was publicly managed restrictions on pesticides in the
EU drinking water directive were ignored on the basis that they had no epidemiological basis.
However, once WSS services were privatised, firms had to give an undertaking that they would
implement these even though, at the time, the technology did not exist to achieve these standards.
Similarly, in Argentina, PSP precipitated an increase in the stringency and enforcement of
environmental regulations, resulting in greater obligations being placed on the private sector than had
been the case for the Government.
On balance, the regulatory system contains in-built checks, because on the one hand PSP offers the
regulator the opportunity to be the champion of the environment, knowing that it can leave the
responsibility of carrying out these improvements to the private company. However, on the other hand,Annex A
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the regulator does not want to be responsible for increasing the cost of the whole process since this
will be passed on to customers in their bills.
Common agency problems
In some countries, a large number of regulatory agencies, dealing with specialised issues (e.g.
economic, environmental, public health and housing), are involved in the sector. In others, there is just
one agency responsible for all functions. There are advantages and disadvantages with both systems.
While multiple agencies are able to focus on their specific areas of expertise, common agency
problems may arise. Separating regulatory duties provides no guarantee that the different bodies will
carry out their duties effectively - they may be under-resourced or their focus may be too narrow. For
example, the environmental regulators who see themselves, first and foremost, as guardians of the
environment may fail to take account of the costs and benefits of the measures introduced. On the
other hand, given the unfortunate experiences of  some ‘super bodies’ which have a multitude of
functions but are not very effective in any of them, an argument could be made for keeping regulatory
functions separate. There are trade-offs to be made. Rather than having one decision maker, having
one decision making process may be a better approach.
The experience of England and Wales provides an example of common agency problems. Legislation
allows for environmental improvements to be made and for the costs to be passed on to the consumer.
However, the existence of two regulators - environmental and economic - can cause problems in
relation to this. For example, a number of companies have been forced by the Environment Agency to
improve water quality, without being granted increased customer tariffs by OFWAT. From the private
companies’ perspective, it is far simpler to limit regulatory responsibilities to one body.  In Mexico City,
problems have also arisen because there are too many interested organisations. The regulator is
sometimes obliged to consult up to 20 different vested interests, making agreement very difficult.
Independence of the regulator
Common agency problems can also result in a lack of regulatory independence. For example, in a
special economic zone in the Philippines there is a joint venture between the responsible authority and
a private water company to supply WSS. If the company wants to change the tariff, it has to seek
approval from the authority in charge of the economic zone. There is a clear case of conflict of
interest here.
In Argentina, the regulator is attached to the Environment Secretary. As a consequence, any
administrative complaint made against the regulator goes directly to the Environment Secretary. This
creates anomalous incentives since one regulator is overseeing the other.
Lack of information
Irrespective of the regulatory framework, the regulator and private company will be forced to operate
in a situation where information is incomplete and unreliable. Unfortunately, the greatest information
deficits are likely to relate to social (since little is understood about WSS in neighbourhoods which have
never had formal services) and environmental (partly because the environmental regulatory agencies
are just coming into existence) aspects of service provision. Because of this information deficit,
contracts are necessarily going to be incomplete. The contract and regulatory framework need to be
flexible enough to deal with this, while still allowing the regulator to enforce the contract.
Incentives
In order to facilitate the regulatory process, there is a strong argument to be made for the integrated
management of water supply and sanitation. If the concession covers both water and sanitation, this
will internalise the incentives for wastewater treatment to the firm since the firm will bear some of theAnnex A
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costs of inadequate treatment through water purification. This will ease the burden on regulatory
capacity.
With integrated management comes the need for integrated regulation. It is far more difficult to
coordinate integrated planning where there are different groups in charge of different aspects of
sectoral regulation, particularly in developing countries where administrative bodies are often relatively
weak.
A.4.4 Bidding Procedures
As with regulation, bidding for contracts should theoretically be a relatively straightforward procedure.
However, in reality, problems such as lack of information on environmental conditions, costs of
provision and service demand for low-income households complicate the design of bidding procedures.
Introduction by Derek Jamieson (Thames Water Utilities, UK)
Pre-requisites for privatisation from the private company’s perspective
Before a water company will even consider involvement in a developing country, certain fundamental
conditions must be met, including:
•  A stable political regime with little risk of privatisation being revised;
•  The ability to repatriate capital and profits;
•  A convertible currency with some degree of exchange rate stability;
•  A reasonable assurance of payment, backed where appropriate by export guarantees; and,
•  The contract must be of sufficient duration to recoup the investment costs.
Once these conditions have been met and the company is considering bidding for a contract, it will take
the following into account:
•  All terms and conditions relating to price, quantity and quality should be specified in the
contract, leaving little discretionary power with the regulatory authority.
•  Creditable procedures for the fair resolution of disagreements should be available through
either a trustworthy judiciary or international arbitration.
•  Technical objectives should be carefully specified and credible. (Often technical
specifications are out of kilter with expectations in terms of price).
•  Government tariff policies should support the principle of full cost recovery. Since it is
easier to get money from customers than from the Government, water companies would
prefer to take their chances with the former.
•  Tariff adjustment formulae should reflect changes in costs, inflation and exchange rates.
•  There should be some historical evidence that consumers are willing to pay for the services
provided. (In many countries the cost of WSS is absorbed by the public sector and the idea
of  payment for WSS is therefore alien).
•  Provision should be made for adequate protection from non-payment (e.g. disconnections,
social subsidy etc…)
•  There should be  a willingness to review/amend public worker laws, contract law,
accounting practices etc… where necessary.
•  Bidding procedures should not be expensive or bureaucratic since it takes substantial time,
effort and money to put a bid together. For example, Thames Water and its partners spent
$6 million on the bid in Buenos Aires.
•  Adequate provision should be made for debt management.  Often the State will expect the
private company to absorb all of the historic costs. This does not present a difficulty as long
as it is explicit in the processAnnex A
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More detailed considerations also include the size of the contract and expected profit margin,
arrangements for the protection of existing staff, the flexibility of labour laws, and the state of labour
relations.
Bidding process
Bidding consortia have three to six months to make an assessment of the state of assets, including
factors such as the amount of non-revenue water. Since uncertainty increases the offer price, it is in
everybody’s interest to try to ensure that the process is transparent and that information is made
available to reduce the degree of uncertainty.
It is important that the international company involved has local office representation since it is
extremely difficult to conduct business from a great distance. Moreover, companies need to have a
proper understanding of the local culture before they are in a position to bid for some contracts.
General Discussion
Local ownership
Many contracts, for example that for Mexico City, require majority local ownership of the private
company.
3 The proportion of local ownership is not necessarily fixed but can change over time. For
example, in one concession in Malaysia, Thames Water have an arrangement whereby they initially
have a 70% shareholding and the local company has 30%. Over a ten-year period, ownership is
transferred such that the local company has a 70% stake and Thames Water 30%. Overseas
companies do not perceive local ownership to be a problem.
Selection criteria
Often the criteria on which offers are judged are very straightforward. In some cases offers are
judged on proposed tariff rates. In others different criteria are used.  For example, in Guyaquil where
low income neighbourhoods are prioritised, the company that promises the highest number of new
connections wins. However, single criteria are seen by some as too simplistic. Moreover, it is felt that
the number of connections is really a political matter that should be specified in the terms of reference
and the bid should then be judged on how companies say they are going to achieve these goals and
what the cost of these will be.
Criteria other than price can be included. However, including additional criteria and entering into more
complex formulas can result in a loss of a large part of the transparency of the process, making it more
prone to corruption. Moreover, stipulating more sophisticated criteria would add to the cost of already
expensive bidding procedures.
Social objectives
Bidding systems where contracts are awarded according to lowest cost criteria effectively
discriminate against the poor since the resulting tariffs tend not to include any surplus which could be
used for social objectives. In this respect, it would be preferable if the bidding process were based on
value for money. For instance, technical criteria might include the capacity of the firm to deal
innovatively and effectively with service provision for lower-income households and neighbourhoods.
At present, poor communities tend to be an afterthought, and provision for them within the contract is
poorly planned. For example, in Argentina it was only realised well into the contract that people could
not afford to pay for their initial connection as a result of the technical criteria specified. In the
Philippines, revenue for the planned community standpipes was through block tariffs which, as is
                                                                
3 This requirement is not restricted to the WSS sector. For example, in Mexico, the requirment for at least 51%
Mexican ownership is stipulated in the more general Foreign Investment Law.Annex A
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widely known, increases the price paid by the poor who often rely upon communal or shared water
points.
The opportunity for addressing social and environmental concerns should be taken at the very
beginning of the process when clarifying objectives, gathering information and designing the contract.
Sufficient examples now exist of different models for providing WSS to poor areas including the
options for service differentiation and alternative management systems as discussed.
The ‘winner’s curse’
Under current bidding procedures, it is often the most over-optimistic company which makes the worst
evaluation of the business that wins. Moreover, since the transaction costs involved in bidding are so
high and since investments in the sector are sunk costs, over-optimistic forecasts tend to be dealt with
through renegotiation of the contract rather than through calling for new bids.
Renegotiation
It was argued that in most Latin American countries, it has generally been the case that the companies
that win have the lowest tariffs. Moreover, it is often the case that companies are aware at the time of
bidding that they will not always reach the goals they promise but know that they will be able to
renegotiate. It was noted that in Latin America, 90% of concessions for WSS have had to be
renegotiated. In Mexico, the contract for the Federal District was also renegotiated, although this
actually led to companies lowering their prices.
It is very uncommon for a company to actually lose its concession as a consequence of failing to meet
its obligations, because the costs of non-agreement are very high for both parties. If renegotiation
becomes common practice, the entire bidding process is undermined.
Risk bearing
Generally, the cost involved in obtaining accurate demand forecasts is borne by the private company.
Water companies and other private  consultancies often provide assistance to governments in
formulating the terms of reference and contract prior to the bidding process. After being involved at
this stage, the water company cannot then participate in the bidding process. This assistance could
extend to surveys to improve the database before the bidding process gets underway. If such
information were made public prior to the process, the government would bear the risk and the private
company would not need to reflect this risk in the price charged to consumers. Moreover, if more
comprehensive information were made available, the risk would be lowered.
Joint ventures are preferred by many private operators, partly because they reduce the risk. Joint
ventures involving formal public/private relationships are more flexible than concessions because all of
the information required - from both the private and public partner - is transparent. For example, the
private sector partner will inform the government of information that would otherwise be confidential.
Because of this transparency, plans can be adjusted accordingly as the programme proceeds.
However, the joint venture approach does not allow for bidding based on price.Annex A
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Research Associate
Environmental Economics Programme, IIED
3 Endsleigh Street
London, WC1H 0DD, UK
Tel  (44 171) 3882117
Email  Nick.Johnstone@iied.org
Dr. Robert Hearne




San Jose, Costa Rica




Environmental Economics Programme, IIED
3 Endsleigh Street
London, WC1H 0DD, UK




Centre de Recherches Microéconomique de Developpement
Université de Cocody
Abidjan, Côte D’Ivoire
Tel  (225) 445915
Fax   (225) 449858
(Unable to attend workshop)
Dr. Martín Rodríguez Pardina
CEER - Instituto de Economía
Universidad Argentina de la Empresa
Lima 717









Tel  (541) 7012805
Email  iied-ma@sei.com.ar or sergiom@iiedma.org.ar
Dr. Lilian Saade
IHE - Infrastructure, Hydraulics, Environment
PO Box 3015, 2601 DA
Delft, Netherlands
Tel  (31 15) 2151770
Email  saade@ihe.nl
Dr. Cristina David
Philippines Institute for Development Studies
NEDA sa Makati Building, 106 Amorsolo Street
Legapsi Village Makati City, Manila, Philippines






Tel  (225) 212988








Administrator, Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
Regulatory Office
Katipunan Road
Balara, Quezon City 1105, Philippines
Tel  (632) 9222969/3757
Fax  (632) 9212887
Engr. Fernando Vicente
Chief Regulator, Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
Balara, Quezon City, Philippines
Tel  (632)  4358900 (office)
Fax  (632)  9116398 (home)
Arq. Miguel Otero
Secretario de Gestión Pública y Territorio
Municipalidad de San Fernando, ArgentinaAnnex A
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Tel (541) 7251688




Edificio Fedeterol, Piso 8
Calle Reyes Ortiz No. 74, Esquina Federico Zuazo


















Environmental and Corporate Controls
Severn Trent
2297 Coventry Road
Birmingham B26 3PU, UK
Tel (44121) 7224903
Email ecc@severntrent.co.uk
Mr. Munguti Katui Katua
Principal Consultant
Water and Sanitation Research






Nugent House, Vastern Road













London W1P 6BQ, UK
Email d.moran@ucl.ac.uk
Mr. M. Webster
Water and Engineering Development Centre (WEDC)






Environmental Resource Management Consultants
8 Cavendish Square





London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
Keppel Street





School of Public Policy




Regional Manager for Asia, WaterAid
Prince Consort House, 27-29 Albert Embankment





Business Partners for Development, WaterAid
Prince Consort House, 27-29 Albert Embankment





Department for International Development
1 Victoria Street, London, UK
Tel.  (44171) 9170394
Email Ian-Curtis@dfid.gtnet.gov.uk
Ms. Jane Crowder
Department for International Development
1 Victoria Street, London, UK








Chief Advisor, TSA.2 - DANIDA
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Asiatisk Plads 2
DK-1448 K, Copenhagen, Denmark
Tel (4533) 920000
Email hanhes@um.dkAnnex A
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